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Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism 
abstract.  This Article offers an alternate account of federalism’s late eighteenth-century or-
igins. In place of scholarly and doctrinal accounts that portray federalism as a repudiation of mod-
els of unitary sovereignty, it emphasizes the federalist ideology of dual sovereignty as a form of 
centralization—a shift from a world of diffuse sovereignty to one where authority was increasingly 
imagined as concentrated in the hands of only two legitimate sovereigns. 
 In making this claim, the Article focuses on two sequential late eighteenth-century transfor-
mations. The first concerned sovereignty. Pre-Revolutionary ideas about sovereignty reflected 
early modern corporatist understandings of authority as well as imperial realities of uneven juris-
diction. But the Revolution elevated a new understanding of sovereignty in which power derived 
from the consent of a uniform people. This conception empowered state legislatures, which, 
throughout the 1780s, sought to use their status under new state constitutions as the sole reposi-
tories of popular authority to subordinate competing claims to authority made by corporations, 
local institutions, Native nations, and separatist movements. 
 The second shift came with the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution, which bol-
stered federal authority partly in order to protect state authority against internal competitors—an 
aim reflected in the Guarantee and New State Clauses. Ultimately, the Constitution both limited 
and enhanced state authority; it entrenched a framework of dual sovereignty. After ratification, 
competitors to state sovereignty were increasingly constrained to appeal to some federal right or 
power. What had previously been contests among supposedly coequal sovereigns—what modern 
scholars would call horizontal federalism—became questions of vertical federalism, issues of 
whether federal authority would vindicate states or their opponents. 
 Although the Article concludes with some implications of this history for present-day feder-
alism doctrine and theory, its primary contribution is descriptive. Judges and lawyers routinely 
and almost unthinkingly invoke localism and power diffusion as the historical values of federalism. 
Yet the history explored here challenges whether these near-universal assumptions about federal-
ism’s aims actually reflect what federalism was designed to accomplish. 
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The soil and the people within these limits [of the United States] are 
under the political control of the government of the United States, or of 
the States of the Union. There exists within the broad domain of sover-
eignty but these two. 




“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery,” Justice Kennedy observed be-
fore proceeding to craft one of the most influential metaphors in modern Amer-
ican law.
2
 “The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their 
idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one fed-
eral, each protected from incursion by the other.”
3
 
Justice Kennedy’s metaphor has proved so durable partly because it tidily 
captures the dominant scholarly and judicial account about federalism and the 
creation of the United States. Eighteenth-century British thought, this account 
stresses, envisioned sovereignty as unitary and indivisible; it denounced the pro-
spect of multiple sovereigns within a single polity as a logical impossibility, a so-
called imperium in imperio.
4
 But Anglo-American revolutionaries rebelled against 
 
1. 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886). 
2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The 
Justices have quoted Kennedy’s language in six subsequent decisions. See Nat’l Fed’n of In-
dep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 643 n.26 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 652 & n.15 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142 (2000) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
504 n.17 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150 (1996) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). According to Westlaw, Justice Kennedy’s phrase has been cited by law review articles 235 
times. 
3. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 838. 
4. The literature on this history is extensive. For an overview of the longstanding historiograph-
ical debates, see Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976). For works discussing British conceptions of sovereignty in the era and 
the colonial American response, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198-229 (1967); JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 165-81 (2011); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 21-25 (abridged ed. 1995); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 344-54 (1998); CRAIG YIRUSH, SETTLERS, LIBERTY, AND 
EMPIRE: THE ROOTS OF EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY, 1675-1775, at 183-270 (2011); and 
Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolu-
tionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 867-69 (1978). For a judicial statement relying on many 




this conception of authority, and out of the Revolution’s ferment emerged a new 
ideology that valorized sovereignty’s division.
5
 The Constitution institutional-
ized this vision by acknowledging both the states and the federal government as 
sovereigns that derived independent authority from the people.
6
 The resulting 
federalist system of dual sovereignty protected individual liberties by diffusing 
governmental power among multiple sovereigns.
7
 
This standard account underpins most judicial decisions concerning federal-
ism, even those that ultimately embrace national authority.
8
 It also provides the 
starting point for most scholarly discussions of federalism, even when they reject 
dual sovereignty as archaic—too constraining, too impoverished by its overreli-
ance on the concept of sovereignty to encompass an increasingly interdependent 
nation and world.
9
 Yet this origin story, this Article argues, is a partial and in-
complete account of federalism and the constitutional moment known as the 
Founding. 
This Article offers an alternate version of federalism’s origins in the late 
eighteenth-century United States—one that, to modify Justice Kennedy’s meta-
phor, tells a story of federalism as fusion, not fission. The advent of “Our Feder-
alism,” I argue, served to centralize as much as to divide authority, as newly em-
powered states sought to assert claims to sovereignty over and against older 
conceptions of fragmented, localized quasi-sovereigns. And, I suggest, the states 
 
5. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 6 (2010) (“The 
core of this new federal ideology was a belief that multiple independent levels of government 
could legitimately exist within a single polity, and that such an arrangement was not a defect 
to be lamented but a virtue to be celebrated.”); see also BAILYN, supra note 4, at 198-229; 
WOOD, supra note 4, at 344-54. 
6. See WOOD, supra note 4, at 344-54. 
7. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of the feder-
alist system is a check on abuses of government power.”); see also Clarence Thomas, Why 
Federalism Matters, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 236-38 (2000) (arguing that the purpose of dual 
sovereignty is to protect individual rights). 
8. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012) (“Federalism, central to the con-
stitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have 
elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”); Gregory, 501 U.S at 457 (“As every 
schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the 
States and the Federal Government.”). 
9. For an overview of current federalism scholarship and its rejection of sovereignty, see Heather 
K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552-61 (2012); and Heather K. 
Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 11-20 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down]. Yet even Gerken 
notes, “I use the term ‘sovereignty’ as a stand-in for a particular understanding of federal-
state relations because it makes sense in terms of federalism’s intellectual history.” Gerken, 
Federalism All the Way Down, supra, at 13. 
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frequently succeeded, often with the assistance of the newly created federal gov-
ernment that was as much state authority’s ally as its enemy. In short, the Article 
reimagines the coming of dual federalism not as a shift from unipolarity to bi-
polarity, but as a move from a world in which sovereignty was diffuse toward 
one where authority was increasingly understood as concentrated in the hands 
of only two legitimate sovereigns. 
In making this claim, the Article focuses on two sequential late eighteenth-
century transformations. The first, involving ideas of sovereignty, occurred dur-
ing the American Revolution and its immediate aftermath. In British North 
America, William Blackstone’s caricatured accounts of unitary sovereignty bore 
little resemblance to reality; power rested with a complex patchwork of local in-
stitutions with independent authority. The prevalent conception of sovereignty 
reflected its origins in an early modern worldview rooted both in the corporatist 
representation of particular communities and in imperial realities of uneven ju-
risdiction. But the Revolution elevated a different understanding of sovereignty, 
one in which authority derived from an imagined and homogenous “people.” 
This conception empowered state legislatures, which claimed to be the authori-
tative repository of the popular will under newly adopted state constitutions. 
Throughout the 1780s, these legislatures sought to wield this newfound sover-
eignty against the competing claimants to authority within state borders—cor-
porations, local institutions, Native nations, separatist movements—and to sub-
ordinate them to state legislative supremacy. 
The second shift came with the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Consti-
tution, a document that, as many have traced, sought to curb the perceived ex-
cesses of state legislatures by expanding federal power while also maintaining 
autonomous and sovereign states outside federal control.
10
 But these aims coex-
isted with another goal: to bolster federal authority in order to protect state au-
thority, especially against internal competitors—a purpose reflected in the de-
bates surrounding the Guarantee and New State Clauses and partially in the 
resulting text. Ultimately, the Constitution, rather than reestablishing older 
ideas about sovereignty, was interpreted both to limit and to enhance state au-
thority. This outcome firmly established a framework of dual sovereignty, as a 
brief tour of postratification history suggests. Competitors to state sovereignty 
continued to resist state authority, but they were now increasingly forced to ap-
peal not to their own inherent sovereignty, but to some federal right or power. In 
other words, what had previously been considered a contest among supposedly 
coequal sovereigns—something akin to what modern scholars would label hori-
zontal federalism—increasingly became a question of vertical federalism, an issue 
of whether federal authority would vindicate states or their opponents. 
 
10. See infra notes 236-243 and accompanying text. 
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Examining federalism and sovereignty in the early United States offers dis-
tinct challenges. Like present-day scholars who lament sovereignty as hopelessly 
imprecise and malleable,
11
 early Americans found the concept baffling. “Who, or 
what, is a sovereignty? What is his or its sovereignty?” Justice Wilson asked in 
1793.
12
 “On this subject, the errors and the mazes are endless and inexplicable.”
13
 
But, notwithstanding these misgivings, Wilson and other Anglo-Americans 
could not seem to escape the term, which they used constantly. Historian Gor-
don Wood has labeled “sovereignty” the “single most important abstraction of 
politics of the entire Revolutionary era.”
14
 
In this Article, I am less interested in defining sovereignty than in tracing 
how the inhabitants of the early United States deployed the term in concrete 
contests over power. Their discussions suggest that this amorphous term proved 
unavoidable because it did important work. Sovereignty encapsulated the prob-
lem of who could legitimately exercise the power to create and adjudicate bind-
ing law—and why. The term implicated two closely entangled questions: where 
this political power came from—its source—and whether that power was unitary 
or could be divided—its nature. Because these unsettled issues were founda-
tional, they constantly recurred: even the most quotidian contest over jurisdic-
tion could, and often did, become a struggle over the meaning and legitimacy of 
authority. 
This frame also challenges Justice Kennedy’s account of American exception-
alism. Although institutions in the United States were distinct, the history I re-
count here fits a global story. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
were, historians have traced, a transnational moment of hardening conceptions 
of sovereignty.
15
 Linked to the rise of nation-states, sovereignty became increas-
 
11. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 59 (1999) 
(“Sovereignty is too vague and anachronistic a term to allow us to reason about anything more 
than our propensity to keep using it.”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The 
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 346 (“The rhetoric of state 
sovereignty is responsible for much of the intellectual poverty of our federalism-related juris-
prudence . . . . ‘[S]overeignty’ does not have any clear, undisputed meaning.”). 
12. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456 (1793). 
13. Id. 
14. WOOD, supra note 4, at 345; see also BAILYN, supra note 4, at 198 (stressing the “pivotal question 
of sovereignty” and arguing that “in the last analysis it was over this issue that the Revolution 
was fought”). 
15. See, e.g., LAUREN A. BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HIS-
TORY, 1400-1900, at 208 (2002) (“Over the span of a handful of decades in the [early] nine-
teenth century . . . formal plural legal orders were transformed into state-dominated legal or-
ders.”); LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN 
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ingly envisioned as uniform authority exercised over space imagined as “terri-
tory,”
16
 an understanding that displaced older logics of localism and pluralism.
17
 
The United States did not transcend this transformation: arguably, it was central 
to it.
18
 The newly created states, I argue here, proved particularly eager adopters 
of this new model of power.
19
 
Federalism offers its own conceptual and methodological questions, the sub-
ject of a vast and thoughtful existing scholarship.
20
 Yet this literature principally 
focuses on early federalism as abstract political theory and doctrine, reconstruct-
ing its contours from conventional sources and texts. This Article, I hope, offers 
 
AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788-1836, at 208 (2010) (suggesting that in the early nineteenth 
century “all the world—metropolis and periphery—engaged in the legal and practical re-
definition of sovereignty, fixing its relations to territorial boundaries and to jurisdiction”). 
16. On the rise of ideas of territorial sovereignty in this period, see CHARLES S. MAIER, ONCE 
WITHIN BORDERS: TERRITORIES OF POWER, WEALTH, AND BELONGING SINCE 1500 (2016); 
Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (a History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 872-87 
(1999); and Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Territory and Boundaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 787, 787-809 (Bardo Fassbender et al. eds., 2012). 
17. See, e.g., TAMAR HERZOG, A SHORT HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE LAST TWO AND A HALF 
MILLENNIA 187 (2018) (arguing that, in revolutionary France, “legislation, guided only by the 
will of the people, was now the only legitimate normative source. No longer could individuals 
and communities appeal to customs, doctrine, religious and moral duties, or even jurispru-
dence.”). 
18. See, e.g., FORD, supra note 15, at 24-25 (suggesting that Georgia “was the first settler polity to 
recognize the need to recraft itself explicitly as a defined, territorial space emptied of indige-
nous people and their laws”); DEBORAH A. ROSEN, BORDER LAW: THE FIRST SEMINOLE WAR 
AND AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 147-57 (2015) (tracing how the United States exported its legal 
interpretations through international-law treatises). 
19. They were not the only ones. Elsewhere I have explored how Native nations and the federal 
government also took up models of authority based on territorial sovereignty. See Gregory 
Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1059-82 (2015) [hereinafter 
Ablavsky, Indian Commerce Clause]; Gregory Ablavsky, Species of Sovereignty: Native Nation-
hood, the United States, and International Law, 1783-1795, 107 J. AM. HIST. (forthcoming 2020). 
20. The literature around federalism is enormous. For a sampling of recent works that focus par-
ticularly on the concept’s early history, see LACROIX, supra note 5; FORREST MCDONALD, 
STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876 (2000); JACK N. RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 161-202 
(1996); Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104 
(2013); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison’s Negative 
and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451 (2010) [hereinafter LaCroix, Au-
thority for Federalism]; Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long 
Founding Moment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 397 (2015) [hereinafter LaCroix, Interbellum Constitution]; 
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997); and Michael 




new contexts by thinking about federalism in the frame of less well-known legal 
and political controversies that unfolded within individual states and along the 
frontier, alongside these more familiar debates. To recount this history, I draw 
partly on primary-source research, but also on dozens of localized studies by 
scholars in fields as diverse as corporate law, local government law, federal Indian 
law, early state and federal constitutional law, and the history of popular and 




My aim in adopting this more expansive scope is not to offer the latest salvo 
in long-running debates over the influence of ideas, interests, and institutions in 
shaping history,
22
 but rather to suggest—even for legal scholars focused on for-
mal doctrine—the value of the capacious perspectives embraced by current intel-
lectual and political history.
23
 Legal history, in the words of James Kloppenberg, 
is the place “where ideas and power collide head-on.”
24
 This Article is about that 
collision and the complicated mixture of theorizing, high-minded rhetoric, po-
litical expediency, legal maneuvering, and material interests that it spawned. 
One helpful way to think about this interaction is to rethink federalism as an 
ideology. Existing literature on the late eighteenth-century United States often 
uses ideology to describe an assemblage of concepts,
25
 but the term’s original, 
 
21. One exception is Dan Hulsebosch, who, in a brief paragraph in his magisterial volume on 
constitutionalism in early New York, partly anticipated the narrative offered here, observing, 
“Centripetal, not centrifugal, forces characterized the constitutional settlement that followed 
the American Revolution. Soon legitimate constitutional authority operated at only two lev-
els: the federal government and the states, with local authority subsumed beneath the latter.” 
DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 8-9 (2005). Yet this point was 
one small strand in a large and complex book, and Hulsebosch did not explicitly return to this 
argument later in the work. 
22. See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE 
FOUNDING ERA 15-18 (2018) (observing, while critiquing, the “false dichotomy . . . that ideas 
and interests stand in fundamental opposition”); LACROIX, supra note 5, at 3-7 (distinguishing 
between “institutional” and “ideological” approaches to federalism’s history). 
23. Cf. JEFFREY L. PASLEY ET AL., BEYOND THE FOUNDERS: NEW APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2004) (containing essays applying modern ap-
proaches to political history); James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically: A Manifesto of 
Pragmatic Hermeneutics, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 201, 201-16 (2012) (describing current meth-
odological techniques in intellectual history). 
24. Kloppenberg, supra note 23, at 207. 
25. See BAILYN, supra note 4; LACROIX, supra note 5; Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of 
Liberal America, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 628 (1987); cf. Caroline Winterer, The Importance of Being 
Ideological, 50 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 308 (2017) (describing Bernard Bailyn’s under-
standing of ideology). 
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Marxist-tinged meaning depicted ideas as embedded and contested within a par-
ticular political and institutional context that advanced certain interests. This 
perspective draws attention both to federalism’s construction at a particular his-
torical moment—how it reflected the struggles that created it—and to the polit-
ical work it performed. As an ideology, federalism, in purporting to describe the 
world, also sought to remake it: it altered and circumscribed the terms of legiti-
mate debate, sometimes in ways that neither its proponents nor its challengers 
anticipated or intended. 
The success of this recrafting is the central theme of this Article. Although 
there may be important implications for present-day federalism doctrine and 
theory, which I explore very briefly at its end, the Article’s most important con-
tribution, in my view, is descriptive. In arguing that dual sovereignty served a 
centralizing function, I am not claiming that it was better or worse than what 
preceded it.
26
 Nor do I argue that federalism does not in fact serve its purported 
ends
27
 or that some other method would better achieve those ends.
28
 This Arti-
cle’s principal claims are empirical, not normative. First, it suggests that, rather 
than serving as an open-ended synonym for multilayered or decentralized gov-
ernance, federalism had a historical meaning as dual federalism, the division of 
authority between the states and the federal government. Second, it contends 
that what we routinely assume to have been federalism’s values at its moment of 
creation were in significant part not the values that actually underlay the con-
struction of dual sovereignty. We cannot simply appeal, I argue, to a singular 
intent underlying federalism—particularly a presumed purpose to diffuse au-
thority—to justify a particular outcome. 
The argument proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, I seek to reconstruct how 
authority functioned in Britain’s North American colonies. I emphasize how 
some current scholarship, although it nicely captures the divide between Black-
stonian theory and reality, arguably distorts matters by depicting the colonies as 
protofederalist when they in fact embraced a model of plural rather than dual 
 
26. I do emphasize federalism’s complicity in what I regard as the unambiguous harm of U.S. 
colonialism, especially as directed against Native peoples. But federalism was not unique in 
this regard: as a quick glance at indigenous history suggests, settler colonial governments, 
however decentralized or centralized, often proved adept at dispossessing and inflicting vio-
lence on Native peoples. See Gregory Evans Dowd, Indigenous Peoples Without the Republic, 
104 J. AM. HIST. 19 (2017). 
27. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997) (assessing whether fed-
eralism serves the ends invoked on its behalf); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for 
Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187 (2005) (arguing that federal-
ism advances localism). 
28. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-27 (1994) (arguing that multiple methods of decentralization would 
accomplish many of the goals claimed for federalism). 
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sovereignty. In Part II, I explore how states after the Revolution used new con-
ceptions of popular sovereignty embodied in their constitutions to claim su-
premacy against older institutions that could also claim to speak for distinct 
communities. In Part III, I consider the effort to create a stronger federal gov-
ernment to protect states’ existing governments. And in Part IV, I explore the 
aftermath of ratification both in the antebellum Supreme Court and in the fight 
over Indian Removal, tracing how in both instances dual sovereignty’s entrench-
ment transformed claims against state authority. I conclude with some brief 
thoughts on this history’s meaning for today. 
i .  the old order:  empire and sovereignty 
Justice Kennedy’s atom-splitting metaphor is appealing partly because it so 
aptly summarizes a century’s worth of scholarship on the intellectual history of 
the American Revolution. Even as historians have debated fiercely the question 
of the Revolution’s origins—one of the oldest questions in American history—
they have largely agreed about the fundamental role of contentions over sover-
eignty.
29
 “The idea of sovereignty,” Gordon Wood has observed, “was at the 
heart of the Anglo-American argument that led to the Revolution.”
30
 
This Part surveys accounts of sovereignty’s history in the thirteen British 
colonies that ultimately became the United States. It first explores the rise of 
Blackstonian conceptions of unitary sovereignty but then notes how poorly 
those ideas fit the distribution of authority in the British Isles, never mind Brit-
ain’s colonies, where power was plural and divided and derived from localist 
conceptions of community representation. Historians have argued that federal-
ism emerged out of this gap, although they have disagreed about how much fed-
eralism merely rationalized existing arrangements or represented a new intellec-
tual development. The Part concludes by surveying this debate, noting that the 
scholars who have argued for continuity have oddly conflated the diffuse power 
arrangements of colonial America with the ideology of federalism. 
 
29. For an overview of these longstanding debates, see Edward G. Gray & Jane Kamensky, Intro-
duction: American Revolutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1, 
1-13 (Jane Kamensky & Edward G. Gray eds., 2013). 
30. WOOD, supra note 4, at 345. For additional scholars’ discussion of this point, see sources cited 
supra note 4. 
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A. Blackstonian Sovereignty and Its Discontents 
The modern concept of sovereignty was relatively new in eighteenth-century 
Britain, having developed, historians suggest, in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.
31
 Yet nearly two centuries of confrontations between the King and Par-
liament had made sovereignty central to British legal thought, and William 
Blackstone’s canonical 1765 Commentaries on the Laws of England codified the po-
litical ideology of the victorious Whigs.
32
 Within each state, Blackstone insisted, 
“there is and must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncon-
trolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, 
reside.”
33
 In Britain, Blackstone concluded, this final authority, “the sovereignty 




Blackstone’s views were highly influential among Britain’s legal and political 
elite.
35
 But it did not take much digging to reveal that Blackstone’s conception 
of sovereignty was a slapdash veneer concealing a more complicated reality. All 
that was required was to turn the page: no sooner had Blackstone announced 
Parliament’s irresistible unitary sovereignty than he plunged into the endless 
ways that British law actually subdivided authority. The clergy, the military, 
households, and employers all enjoyed extensive and often irrevocable privi-
leges.
36
 As for the “law,” Blackstone revealed it to be a hodgepodge of doctrines 
and customs administered by an intricate tangle of common-law, equitable, ec-
clesiastical, military, manorial, and maritime courts, not to mention a bizarre ar-




31. There are numerous histories of sovereignty. For a classic overview, see F.H. HINSLEY, SOVER-
EIGNTY (2d ed. 1986). For more recent works, see ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: EVOLU-
TION OF AN IDEA (2007); and RAIA PROKHOVNIK, SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORY AND THEORY 
(2008). 
32. DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGH-
TEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 1-55 (2002); David Lieberman, The Mixed Constitution and the 
Common Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT 
317, 321-24 (Mark Goldie & Robert Wokler eds., 2006). 
33. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *49. 
34. Id. at *51. 
35. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 32, at 31-32. 
36. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *364-454. 
37. 3 id. at *22-85. Among the courts of special jurisdiction Blackstone recorded were courts of 
forests, of sewers, of policies of assurance, of Marshalsea, of the duchy chamber of Lancaster, 
and also the stannary courts of Devonshire and Cornwall, which administered justice among 
the tin miners. Id. at *71-85. 
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And that was just within England. Out in the empire, territorial unevenness 
exacerbated these jurisdictional complexities: Blackstone traced a confusing wel-
ter of incorporated kingdoms (Wales and Scotland), dependent subordinate 
kingdoms (Ireland), and anomalous municipalities and territories (Berwick-
upon-Tweed, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands).
38
 Based on localized 
settlements, these places all enjoyed slightly distinct relationships to Parliament 
and English law—whether through restrictions on Parliament’s power to alter 
private rights,
39
 through restraints on courts’ jurisdiction,
40
 or through the prin-
ciple enunciated in Calvin’s Case that the common law did not of its own force 
extend into conquered countries.
41
 
In theory, if all this power radiated outward from Parliament, this profusion 
of laws and institutions was consistent with Blackstone’s account. Yet in practice, 
this unevenness and diversity reflected a different vision of sovereignty, one 
rooted in the thought of the medieval and early modern world that had created 
these institutions. Arguably epitomized by the common law thought of men like 
Matthew Hale and Edward Coke, this account differed from Blackstone’s at-
tempted rationalization in explaining both the source and the nature of power. 
Under this conception of an “Ancient Constitution,” law derived its authority 
not from the sovereign’s command but from its historical pedigree, particularly 
its role as the organic expression of the centuries-old customs of a particular 
people.
42
 As for sovereignty’s nature, this common law order imagined law’s lack 
of uniformity as a virtue, not a vice: multiple legal orders represented the distinct 
places, estates, and groups within society.
43
 
This understanding of sovereignty—as plural, corporate, and communitar-
ian—resembled what modern scholars dub localism, although it tied authority 
as much to particular people as to place.
44
 While in its own way as much a legal 
 
38. 1 id. at *93-115. 
39. Id. at *96. 
40. Id. at *98, *104. 
41. Id. at *105. On Calvin’s Case, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Ex-
panding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439 (2003); and 
Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 73 (1997). 
42. For an overview of this jurisprudential world, see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITU-
TION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY (2d ed. 1987). See also GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITU-
TION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603-1642 (1993). 
43. POCOCK, supra note 42, at 30-55. 
44. For one account of localism, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
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fiction as Blackstone’s account, this approach was arguably closer to the experi-
ence of most eighteenth-century Britons, who encountered power not emanat-
ing from an all-powerful Parliament but through a complex and uneven patch-
work of customary institutions inherited from a medieval and early modern past. 
B. American Sovereignties 
In certain respects, Britain’s North American colonies more closely resem-
bled the Blackstonian ideal than the British Isles did. Colonization had simplified 
and purged many vestigial institutions: most colonies had but a single, two-tier 
court system, and only New York created separate equity courts.
45
 Moreover, co-




Yet in other ways, the distribution of legal authority in the colonies diverged 
even more sharply from Blackstone’s vision than it did in Britain. Parliament, 
after all, was far away and rarely legislated for the colonies.
47
 In practice, the 
colonies—many of which were created as corporations or proprietorships and so 
held explicit right-conferring charters—governed themselves with minimal Brit-
ish oversight.
48
 And even then, authority did not radiate from each provincial 
capital outward. Rather, governance in British North America was arguably even 
more localized than in early modern Britain. In New England, towns played the 
central role in regulating daily life, with control literally in the hands of the peo-
ple in the form of the town meeting.
49
 To the south, where counties were the key 
administrative units, political life centered on the county courts, which not only 
 
45. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 25-46 (1992); Mary Sarah 
Bilder, English Settlement and Local Governance, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMER-
ICA 63, 91-96 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds. 2008). 
46. The historian John Murrin famously called this process “Anglicization.” See John M. Murrin, 
The Legal Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in COLONIAL 
AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 540, 540 (Stanley N. Katz & John M. 
Murrin eds., 3d ed. 1983). 
47. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EX-
TENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 56-74 (1986). 
48. On the colonial charters, see CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND 
CIVIC IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580-1865, at 133-90 (2010); and Bilder, 
supra note 45, at 66-82. 
49. See, e.g., GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN 
TRADITION AND DESIGN 68-84 (1960); KENNETH A. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN: THE 
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1970); MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND 
TOWNS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1970). 
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adjudicated cases but also governed, setting tax rates, building roads, and enact-
ing ordinances.
50
 Court days were also the foundation for local social life.
51
 
Throughout colonial America, as scholars have traced, the concept of the com-
munity was the font of moral and political authority, invoked to justify both 
criminal and civil regulation.
52
 Early America, in fact, was full of official and 
quasi-official organizations whose authority and legitimacy rested in their role 
as the institutional embodiment of the community: juries, municipal corpora-
tions, militias, churches, and even mobs, which, as in early modern England, 
claimed a legitimate role in defending the community’s interests.
53
 
If early America was arguably more localized than Britain, it was also, para-
doxically, more expansive and cosmopolitan as well. British settlements in North 
America were diverse and polyglot; many communities—the Dutch in New 
York, the Germans in Pennsylvania, the Scots-Irish in the so-called backcoun-
try—maintained their own legal identity and customs.
54
 There was also a vast 
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51. RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-1790, at 88-94 (1982). 
52. See WILLIAM EDWARD NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LE-
GAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 36-63 (1975) (tracing how Massa-
chusetts law was rooted in community norms); Jack P. Greene, Law and the Origins of the 
American Revolution, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 45, at 447, 
470 (“[L]aw in the 1760s and 1770s was still as much thought of as custom and community 
consensus as sovereign command.”); Hendrik Hartog, Distancing Oneself from the Eighteenth 
Century: A Commentary on Changing Pictures of American Legal History, in LAW IN THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: A COLLECTION OF REVIEW ESSAYS ON 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 229, 241 (Hendrik Hartog ed., 1981) (“Colonists defined law not 
as an instrument of state policy but as a bulwark against centralized authority, as a reflection 
and a defender of community, customary authority.”); cf. BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND 
STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987) (observing a shift from 
the community-based legal norms of the seventeenth century toward a more formalist system 
in eighteenth-century Connecticut). 
53. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: LAW AND THE CON-
STITUTION ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE, 1735-1776, at 23-45 (2018) (describing the role of 
law-finding juries and other institutions in colonial America’s “localist constitutionalism”); 
Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & 
MARY Q. 3 (1970) (discussing the role of mobs in early America, when mobs were “an integral 
and even respected element of the political order”). 
54. See, e.g., PATRICK GRIFFIN, THE PEOPLE WITH NO NAME: IRELAND’S ULSTER SCOTS, AMERICA’S 
SCOTS IRISH, AND THE CREATION OF A BRITISH ATLANTIC WORLD, 1689-1764 (2001) (describ-
ing Scots-Irish legal culture); A.G. ROEBER, PALATINES, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: GERMAN LU-
THERANS IN COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA (1993) (discussing the persistence of German legal 
norms); David Thomas Konig, Regionalism in Early American Law, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HIS-
TORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 45, at 145, 163 (recounting Dutch common law in the 
Middle Colonies). 
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space beyond the narrow strip of British settlements huddled along the coast. 
Ostensibly, this enormous swath of continent also fell under British control, as 
many colonies’ charters grandiosely extended their boundaries all the way to the 
Pacific Ocean. Yet reality in these contested regions differed sharply from the 
mapmakers’ visions of neatly bounded territories. 
Key to understanding how sovereignty functioned in the early American 
West is the concept of empire. As important recent scholarship has stressed, and 
as Blackstone’s litany of purported English possessions underscores, imperial 
sovereignty, rather than emanating from a single definitive source, was geo-
graphically uneven, expressed through what historian Lauren Benton calls “cor-
ridors and enclaves” and frequently attached to individuals rather than territo-
ries.
55
 As a result, legal pluralism—in which multiple sources of law coexisted 
within a single society—was particularly pronounced in colonial spaces.
56
 Recent 
studies of colonial American constitutional thought have stressed pluralism as 
its touchstone and organizing concept.
57
 
Unevenness and pluralism offer a much more accurate description of British 
sovereignty beyond the Appalachians, both as a matter of fact and of imperial 
law, than unitary authority does. The Native peoples who owned, inhabited, and 
governed most of the supposed territory of Britain’s North American colonies, 
for one, would have found British claims to sovereignty laughable. British offi-
cials struggled to make sense of Native status, often describing allied Native na-
tions as the empire’s “subjects.”
58
 This was a dubious claim—as one French ob-
server wrote, any Englishman who told Native peoples “that they are the 
 
55. LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 
1400-1900, at xii-xiv (2010). 
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in imperial contexts, see BENTON, supra note 15; and LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, 1500-
1850 (Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013). 
57. See, e.g., VICKI HSUEH, HYBRID CONSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGING LEGACIES OF LAW, PRIVILEGE, 
AND CULTURE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 1-24 (2010) (stressing the hybridity and pluralism of the 
colonial American constitutional order). 
58. See, e.g., JENNY HALE PULSIPHER, SUBJECTS UNTO THE SAME KING: INDIANS, ENGLISH, AND THE 
CONTEST FOR AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 27-31 (2005) (recounting English co-
lonial descriptions of Native peoples as “subjects”); cf. GREGORY EVANS DOWD, WAR UNDER 
HEAVEN: PONTIAC, THE INDIAN NATIONS & THE BRITISH EMPIRE 178-85 (2002) (recounting 
British debates over Native status in the wake of the Seven Years’ War). For background on 
debates on the meaning of subjecthood in the late eighteenth-century British Empire, see 
HANNAH WEISS MULLER, SUBJECTS AND SOVEREIGN: BONDS OF BELONGING IN THE EIGH-
TEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH EMPIRE (2017). 
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Subjects of England” “[ran] the Risk of being massacred.”
59
 Yet, however gran-
diose, claims of Native subjecthood were still weak assertions of British author-
ity. Subject status implied only that the King had taken Native nations under his 
protection; it did not “subject a People residing in a foreign Country, to the Do-
minion or Laws of the crown of Great-Britain,” as South Carolina’s legislature 
concluded in the early eighteenth century.
60
 Even Native communities in places 
like New England and Virginia, engulfed by the British, successfully invoked 
their autonomous status under British law to thwart surrounding colonies’ ef-
forts to assert jurisdiction over them.
61
 Native peoples, in short, remained for-
eign nations, albeit in some ambiguous relationship with British authority. 
Native peoples were not the only ones asserting independent authority in the 
continent’s vast interior. Multiple groups of Anglo-Americans embraced a vision 
of sovereignty that promised that, just as in the past, new polities could be cre-
ated in the supposedly empty spaces of the early American West notwithstand-
ing the jurisdictional claims of both Native nations and existing colonial govern-
ments. One such group was colonial elites who established a host of land 
companies—among them the Indiana, Vandalia, Illinois and Wabash, and Ohio 
Companies—to create new western settlements.
62
 More than simple land spec-
ulations, these efforts seized on what one historian has called “corporate sover-
eignty” within British law, which empowered joint-stock companies in imperial 
domains to establish their own courts, legislatures, laws, and even armies.
63
 
Other, less well-heeled Anglo-Americans shared this vision of sovereignty. 
Before and during the American Revolution, Anglo-American settlers traveled 
beyond the Appalachian Mountains and began to establish new communities: 
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60. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO EXAMINE INTO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE PEOPLE 
OF GEORGIA, WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, AND THE DISPUTES SUB-
SISTING BETWEEN THE TWO COLONIES 28 (Charles-Town, S.C., Lewis Timothy 1736). 
61. The Mohegans and Narragansetts, for instance, both surrounded by New Englanders, suc-
cessfully pursued appeals in which the Crown, although still equivocal about their precise 
status, nonetheless endorsed their independence from colonial governance. See MARY SARAH 
BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE 136 
(2004) (exploring an appeal by the Narragansetts to the Assembly); YIRUSH, supra note 4, at 
113-41 (tracing the Mohegans’ successful appeal to the British Crown in the 1740s). 
62. On the history of these land companies, see SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND COM-
PANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT 74-132 (1939); and ALAN TAYLOR, 
AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750-1804, at 77-83 (2016). 
63. See PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EARLY MOD-
ERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA (2011). 
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the Watauga Association and Cumberland Settlement in western North Caro-
lina; Westsylvania and Transylvania in western Virginia.
64
 Lacking any formal 
authorization other than dubious Indian land deeds, these settlers implicitly as-
sumed the right to create new settlements under conceptions of popular sover-
eignty.
65
 Under their own authority, they created court systems and local gov-
ernments and sometimes even drafted their own constitutions.
66
 
In the vast spaces beyond the Anglo-American coastal settlements, then, sov-
ereignty seemed up for grabs. Existing colonies might point to charters and maps 
to establish their authority, but there were other, more persuasive claims. Native 
nations had the strongest rights, even under British law, but longstanding prac-
tices of colonization encouraged ordinary and elite Anglo-Americans alike to en-
vision the West as a place where new sovereigns could be created. As Blackstone 
himself suggested, the British Empire created a capacious and adaptable struc-
ture that facilitated all sorts of claims to autonomy under the broad and loose tie 
of subjecthood and common allegiance. Given this history, established colonies 
could hardly be surprised to find a wealth of competitors who sought to claim 
the same rights to authority that they had. 
C. Sovereignty, Localism, and Federalism 
The gap between Blackstone’s vision of unitary sovereignty and North 
American realities, historians have long noted, provided a major impetus for the 
Revolution.
67
 Seeking to defend local prerogative against parliamentary incur-
sion, Britain’s North American colonists crafted diverse theories that rejected 
Blackstonian conceptions of sovereignty.
68
 They distinguished between internal 
and external subject matters of legislation, or between taxation and regulation, 
 
64. On Watauga, see J.G.M. RAMSEY, THE ANNALS OF TENNESSEE TO THE END OF THE EIGH-
TEENTH CENTURY 92-174 (1853); on Cumberland, see KRISTOFER RAY, MIDDLE TENNESSEE, 
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(2007); on Transylvania and Westsylvania, see PATRICK GRIFFIN, AMERICAN LEVIATHAN: EM-
PIRE, NATION, AND REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER 125-50 (2007); and CLAUDIO SAUNT, WEST OF 
THE REVOLUTION: AN UNCOMMON HISTORY OF 1776, at 19-26 (2014). 
65. See GRIFFIN, supra note 64, at 150 (describing these efforts as an expression of “self-sover-
eignty”). 
66. Both Watauga and Cumberland, for instance, adopted fundamental laws (known as the Arti-
cles of Association and the Cumberland Compact, respectively) and established their own 
court systems. JOHN R. FINGER, TENNESSEE FRONTIERS: THREE REGIONS IN TRANSITION 46-
47, 82-83 (2001). 




or between royal and parliamentary authority.
69
 But at every turn, Americans 
confronted the same counterargument—the supposedly fatal charge of imperium 
in imperio that was, in the parlance of the time, a “solecism,” a contradiction in 
terms.
70
 If sovereignty was the ultimate authority, this argument ran, it had to 
be unitary; there could not be multiple sovereigns within a single polity.
71
 
It was from this intellectual ferment, historians emphasize, that federalism 
as both ideology and institution emerged in the Revolution’s wake. One increas-
ingly common Anglo-American rebuttal to the supposed inconsistency of mul-
tiple sovereigns relied on thinking about the source of sovereignty, particularly 
the concept of popular sovereignty.
72
 There was, early American political think-
ers came to insist after the War, a single ultimate sovereign in their new polity—
the people at large, who delegated their authority to both the federal government 
and the state governments.
73
 But there was another response to British argu-
ments hashed out during the Revolution, one that concerned not just sover-
eignty’s source but also its nature. Rejecting the premise that sovereigns could 
not coexist, Anglo-Americans came to accept, and even valorize, the possibility 
of divided authority.
74
 This embrace of multiple sovereigns provided what Ali-
son LaCroix has described as federalism’s ideological origins.
75
 
Within this broadly shared narrative, however, scholars have disagreed, par-
ticularly over the relationship between federalism and its colonial antecedents. 
Gordon Wood, for instance, has forcefully argued that federalism, far from a 
 
69. WOOD, supra note 4, at 350-54. Eric Nelson has recently argued that some Anglo-Americans 
adopted the Stuart “dominion” theory, which denied parliamentary supremacy by defending 
royal prerogative. See ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMER-
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overlapping legislative authority by invoking royal prerogative as a justification for power un-
der colonial charters. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Plural Prerogative, 68 WM. & MARY Q. 583 
(2011). 
70. See WOOD, supra note 4, at 352. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 363-72. 
73. Id. at 543-47. 
74. See LACROIX, supra note 5, at 221 (“Between the middle decades of the eighteenth century and 
the early years of the nineteenth century, federal thought was transformed from a heterodox 
willingness to tolerate messy, multilayered government into an affirmative belief that such 
multiplicity—untidy though it might be—could form the basis for a new species of union.”). 
75. Id. at 6. 
the yale law journal 128:1792  2019 
1810 
novelty, merely codified the existing realities of dispersed authority within the 
colonies.
76
 LaCroix responded by insisting that the acceptance of divided sover-
eignty in the late eighteenth century, although rooted in earlier practices, none-
theless represented a “significant innovation,” positing more diverse intellectual 
origins of federalist ideology.
77
 
The unspoken core of this debate concerned the fundamental nature of fed-
eralism. “Americans’ acute sense of localism and their long familiarity with par-
celed and apportioned political power from below,” Wood claimed, “were the 
real sources of their idea of federalism.”
78
 Yet this neat conflation between local-
ism and federalism is untenable. Federalism was not simply the institutionaliza-
tion of the myriad, localized ways in which early Americans dispersed authority; 
its historical meaning was inseparable from the division of sovereignty solely 
between the states and the federal government.
79
 
In this more historically precise sense, federalism was novel: sovereignty was 
not neatly vertically arrayed in colonial America. There were, to be sure, imperial 
institutions resembling federalism that Anglo-Americans later drew upon when 
crafting the Constitution,
80
 but they formed only one of many ways that sover-
eignty and authority were divided within colonial America. To privilege the prac-




Similarly, colonies were not straightforward proto-states with authority em-
anating from provincial capitals. Although some colonial institutions—legisla-
tures, governors, judiciaries—resembled later state institutions, they were 
merely one set among many, and not necessarily thought to be supreme: local 
courts sometimes disregarded colonial legislatures’ dictates as ill-suited for local 
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 What happened in colonial administrative centers was often a vi-
tuperative, faction-ridden elite struggle that pitted institutions against each 
other.
83
 Large swathes of each colony, often derisively called the “backcountry” 
or “marchland,” were excluded from this elite game, a marginalization these re-
gions’ inhabitants resented as acutely as many colonial legislators disliked par-
liamentary supremacy.
84
 Populist revolts that invoked the people to justify re-
sistance against provincial governments were far more common in colonial 
America than were attacks on parliamentary supremacy.
85
 
These dynamics carried into Anglo-Americans’ opposition to British author-
ity during the imperial crisis. Resistance manifested throughout the multiple in-
stitutions that claimed legitimate authority in colonial society: county conven-
tions, church gatherings, town meetings, militias, mobs, and associations and 
committees of all sorts organized alongside colonial legislatures to resist British 
rule, all claiming to speak on the people’s behalf.
86
 Moreover, the tax revolt 
against distant British authority inspired similar popular resistance to provincial 
legislatures themselves. The most notable instance occurred in North Carolina, 
where western farmers, angered by the taxes imposed by their colonial legisla-
ture, organized.
87
 Calling themselves the Regulators—a name drawn from a sev-
enteenth-century English practice that allowed inspection of the actions of the 
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—they gathered at county meetings of representatives selected in 
each neighborhood and ultimately marched on and attacked proceedings at the 
provincial court.
89
 North Carolina’s governor ultimately suppressed the rebel-




Such actions reveal a more complex pre-Revolutionary reality than the sim-
ple depiction of protofederalist colonies waiting to throw off British rule. Pro-
vincial legislatures could, and did, claim the mantle of local authority. But they 
had competition from many other institutions, widely regarded as closer and 
more representative of “the people” than were the distant legislatures; these in-
stitutions, could, and did, readily repurpose arguments against imperial rule 
from Britain to reject rule from provincial capitals. Britain’s thirteen rebellious 
colonies, in short, were certainly localist, but they were not federalist in the sense 
that sovereignty was located in each colony. Creating that kind of federalism—a 
federalism founded on sovereign states—would require significant work and 
considerable struggle in the following years. 
i i .  the new order: state attacks on competing sovereigns 
With the Declaration of Independence, the United States rejected any pre-
tense of parliamentary or royal sovereignty. The Declaration proclaimed thirteen 
“Free and Independent States,” an international-law term of art for sovereign 
nations.
91
 Even before the Declaration, the Continental Congress had urged 
states to form new governments grounded in the “authority of the people,” and 




These constitutions codified two central strands of Revolutionary thought. 
First, they reflected the growing dominance of an ideology of popular sover-
eignty that rooted all legitimate authority in the people.
93
 “[A]ll political power 
 
88. Id. at 2. 
89. Id. at 133-47, 182-84. 
90. Id. at 197. 
91. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776); see also DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DEC-
LARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 29-56 (2007). 
92. 4 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 342, 357-58 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906); see also MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY & LIBERTY: 
STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1997) (describing the creation 
of early state constitutions). 
93. The topic of popular sovereignty in the era of the American Revolution is vast. For important 
treatments, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
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is vested in and derived from the people only,” read one provision with close 
analogs in multiple state constitutions.
94
 “That the people of this State ought to 
have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and po-
lice thereof” often followed close behind.
95
 This vision of authority was im-
portantly different from the concept of power rooted in particular local commu-
nities: it envisioned the sovereign people as a homogenous whole. During the 
1780 drafting of Massachusetts’s constitution, some in western Massachusetts 
sought to preserve the towns’ “rights, Liberties, and Privilidges” by arguing that 
the state was the sum of its parts, “several Bodies Corporate of which the great 
whole is formed.”
96
 But a majority of the convention rejected that vision. The 
new constitution’s preamble described a single “body politic” that formed a com-
pact by the “whole people.”
97
 The processes of creating most of the new state 
constitutions reflected this understanding; they relied on special conventions 
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power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.”). 
95. See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, &c, art. II; N.C. CONST. of 1776, A 
Declaration of Rights, &c, art. II; PA. CONST. of 1776, art. III; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. 
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96. JOHANN N. NEEM, CREATING A NATION OF JOINERS: DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EARLY 
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97. MASS. CONST. pmbl. 
98. See TUCK, supra note 93, at 183-212; WOOD, supra note 4, at 306-43. 
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Second, although many at the time sought to distinguish between the sover-
eign people and the government,
99
 in practice the new state constitutions privi-
leged popularly elected legislatures, granting them “supreme legislative power” 
on behalf of the people.
100
 Newly created state executives, by contrast, tended to 
be weak and were often selected by legislatures.
101
 The result was that, after the 
Revolution, state legislatures, not magistrates or judges, “stood at the apex of 
the American legal system,” in the words of one historian.
102
 
Taken together, the new state constitutions suggested an understanding of 
sovereignty that, notwithstanding Revolutionary tumult, resembled Black-
stone’s. In this conception, the people empowered state legislatures, as their 
most direct representative, to act as the de facto supreme authority within the 
state. But just as in the case of Blackstone, this vision of governance was an ide-
ology rather than a description of reality. The new constitutions did not sweep 
away longstanding inherited practices that had splintered authority and legiti-
macy among diverse institutions. If anything, the realities of war making de-
volved power further, as the old order’s collapse emboldened institutions all to 
claim supremacy in the midst of the War’s uncertainty and upheaval. 
The result was an intense struggle over the nature and meaning of sover-
eignty that persisted after the War’s end and dominated what historian John 
Fiske long ago dubbed the “critical period”: the decade of the 1780s.
103
 Parts of 
this history are well known, captured in the standard narrative of the drive to-
ward the Constitution. For example, many scholars have noted how nationalists, 
especially James Madison, recoiled from the perceived excesses of unfettered 
state legislatures, which often came at the expense of minority rights.
104
 Madison 
and others accordingly created institutions, particularly a strengthened federal 
 
99. See generally TUCK, supra note 93, at 252-80 (discussing the sovereign/government distinc-
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101. See WOOD, supra note 4, at 135-57. 
102. Henretta, supra note 83, at 592; see also id. (“Thanks to the new state constitutions, the legis-
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103. JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783-1789 (Cambridge, Mass., Riv-
erside Press 1892). 
104. WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 5-16 (2007); 




government, that were designed to check such abuses and forestall the frequent 
clashes between states that marked the era.
105
 
Yet alongside these well-documented debates was another, largely ignored 
contest for authority, as state legislatures sought to make their paper power real 
by establishing their supremacy against competitors for sovereignty. Their target 
in this campaign was what modern scholars might deem group rights: the au-
thority rooted in an enduring early modern worldview of corporatist institutions 
that claimed organic legitimacy from the people or from a subset of them. There 





 and voluntary associa-
tions.
108
 But in this Part, I focus on four particularly significant early American 
sites of governance: corporate “bodies politic”; localist institutions such as 
towns, courts, and juries; Native nations; and movements for would-be new 
states. Against each of these competitors, states wielded their potent new ideo-
logical weapon: a uniform sovereign “people” who had, in the fundamental and 
supreme law of the new state constitutions, sanctioned state legislatures as their 
primary agents. The Part concludes by looking at one of the era’s most substan-
tial challenges to state authority, Shays’s Rebellion—an event that wove together 
 
105. HOLTON, supra note 104, at 180-200; LaCroix, Authority for Federalism, supra note 20, at 461-
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suspicion of such associations: Jefferson, for instance, feared that they would “take the gov-
ernment out of its constitutional hands” and “jeopardize the march of regular government.” 
NEEM, supra note 96, at 5; see also RONEY, supra, at 184-85 (describing suspicions of voluntary 
associations in post-Revolution Pennsylvania). Ultimately, like business corporations and 
others, see infra notes 109-115, voluntary associations became less threatening as they prolif-
erated and explicitly subordinated themselves to state law. See generally KEVIN BUTTERFIELD, 
THE MAKING OF TOCQUEVILLE’S AMERICA: LAW AND ASSOCIATION IN THE EARLY UNITED 
STATES (2015) (describing concepts of membership, characterized by law and procedural fair-
ness, which underpinned the early proliferation of voluntary associations). 
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many of these claims to sovereignty, profoundly unsettling many of the nation’s 
political elite in the process. 
A. Corporations 
Corporations—“artificial persons,” Blackstone wrote, “constitute[d]” by the 
government
109
—flourished in the era following the American Revolution, as the 
new state legislatures issued hundreds of corporate charters.
110
 In part, this push 
manifested a postwar profusion of civic engagement and republicanism. But 
many of these newly incorporated institutions were not actually new: they were 
the diverse “bodies politic”—municipalities, churches, colleges, civic organiza-
tions, and for-profit companies devoted to infrastructure and public works—that 
had long characterized early America.
111
 They incorporated now in part because, 
as legislatures supplanted the King, the legislative charter replaced the more on-
erous requirement of royal assent to create a corporation.
112
 
In theory, these new corporations were the states’ servants. Incorporation 
required an express charter from the state legislature, making corporations’ ex-
istence and authority entirely dependent on state approval.
113
 Moreover, the re-
quirement that corporations serve a public purpose led early Americans to regard 
them as “agencies of government,” in that the state authorized their creation to 
serve the public interest.
114
 These understandings explain the anxiety state ad-
vocates frequently expressed at the constitutional convention that states would 
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Yet early American law afforded corporations many of the attributes of sov-
ereignty. Authorized to craft and enforce their own legal orders, corporations 
looked and acted a lot like states. Pennsylvanian James Wilson collapsed the dis-
tinction, insisting, “[s]tates are corporations or bodies politic of the most im-
portant and dignified kind.”
116
 Historians have picked up on Wilson’s analogy, 
noting the close parallels between corporate charters and the advent of state con-
stitutions: both documents represented fundamental written law that simulta-
neously empowered and restrained.
117
 Many states, in fact, had sprung from in-
corporated chartered colonies.
118
 And Anglo-Americans knew, too, of the great 
“company-states” of the late eighteenth-century British world that claimed sov-
ereignty over enormous imperial territories.
119
 The British East India Company, 
which ruled much of the Indian subcontinent, was a particular bugbear that 
demonstrated the evils of unchecked corporate authority.
120
 
Moreover, it was not clear that corporate authority was in fact subject to state 
legislative control. Many at the time believed that, because corporate charters 
were a form of property right, legislatures lacked the power to alter them once 
given.
121
 This conclusion reflected the longstanding common law vision of cor-
porate charters as a check on governmental authority, a view grounded in earlier 
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To many in the early United States, then, corporations looked less like crea-
tures of the states than rivals for their power. For this reason, chartering corpo-
rations proved to be among the most controversial legislative acts of the post-
Revolutionary period. Opponents of these decisions—a group the historian 
Louis Hartz labeled the “anti-charter” movement—offered diverse critiques of 
corporations, but among the most frequent was that corporations arrogated to 
themselves the rights of sovereignty properly placed in the representatives of the 
people.
123
 They threatened to become, in the words of a pamphlet challenging 




The fear that corporate power would trample state authority appeared 
throughout the new states from the 1780s into the 1790s. In Baltimore, oppo-
nents of a proposal to transform the town into a municipal corporation consist-
ing mostly of appointed officials bemoaned the “sovereign power[s] vested in 
the Corporation” outside any control of the “acts of Assembly and the Constitution 
of the State.”
125
 In New York, the Council of Revision—which had the power to 
veto legislation—rejected efforts to charter a workingman’s association and to 
expand the powers of the city of New York.
126
 Corporations, the council warned, 
were “to most purposes independent republics” endowed with “all the powers 
of legislation”; if the rage for incorporating continued, “the State, instead of be-
ing a community of free citizens pursuing the public interest, may become a 
community of corporations . . . composing an aristocracy destructive to the Con-
stitution and independence of the State.”
127
 In Massachusetts, the state legisla-
ture censured the controversial Order of the Cincinnati, an association of officers 
who had served in the Continental Army, for usurping the authority to deter-
mine public policy, “for which purpose the people of these United States have 
constituted and established their legislatives and Congress.”
128
 The Cincinnati, 
the legislature warned, threatened to become a “select society . . . independent 
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But the fiercest confrontations concerned banks. The prospect that an un-
elected, self-governing elite might wield substantial power by controlling money 
and credit prompted deep anxieties over the creation of “government[s] within 
a government” that would challenge the supremacy of popular authority.
130
 The 
most intense struggle occurred in Pennsylvania, where state representatives 
waged a lengthy and protracted battle over the charter of the Bank of North 
America.
131
 Critics feared the Bank’s seeming independence from government, 
anxious that the corporation would soon “dictate to the legislature” which laws 
to enact.
132
 William Findley, the Bank’s primary opponent, attacked arguments 
that the Bank’s charter could not be altered once granted. The “supreme legisla-
tive power of every community,” he insisted, “necessarily possesses a power of 
repealing every law inimical to the public safety.”
133
 
These contests over corporate charters in the 1780s and 1790s resolved little. 
They augured similar struggles that would persist well into the nineteenth cen-
tury.
134
 But this period set the frame for those later conflicts, which would also 
be cast as fights over sovereignty, where corporations’ assertions of autonomy 
were read as a challenge and an affront to state legislative control. Both corpora-
tions and states possessed written documents that conferred powers and rights, 
but increasingly only state legislatures could claim the mantle and authority of 
popular sovereignty, while corporate claims became an antidemocratic form of 
privilege. 
B. Localism 
Revolutionary resistance to parliamentary authority rested in part on an ide-
ology of localism. “Whig theory of law,” historian Hendrik Hartog has observed, 
“was grounded . . . in a perception of the autonomy of local legal institutions as 
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independent recipients of constitutional power and authority . . . .”
135
 The Rev-
olution’s exigencies encouraged this devolution; as centralized institutions col-
lapsed, localities increasingly took on the responsibilities of war making, leading 
them to be viewed as “sovereign entities.”
136
 But in the post-Revolutionary pe-
riod, as states remade inherited institutions of governance, localism came under 
attack. Often, these changes came through reforms that sought to make local 
institutions more democratic by making them more responsive to the will of the 
people.
137
 Yet, because of the supposed congruence between the “people” and 
their self-proclaimed representatives—the state legislatures—these transfor-
mations often asserted state legislative supremacy over and against older com-
peting claims of local authority. This struggle between conceptions of state and 
local sovereignty occurred across multiple institutions of local governance: 
courts, municipalities, juries, and mobs. 
At the time of the Revolution, local county courts—long the heart of colonial 
legal systems—retained considerable authority in nearly every American col-
ony.
138
 These courts, staffed by justices of the peace (JPs) who were often un-
elected local notables with no formal legal training, combined adjudication with 
responsibilities of administrative governance.
139
 The justice they administered 
was what historian Laura Edwards refers to as the “peace,” rooted in customary 




Yet precisely because of their power in a common law system, these judges, 
particularly when unelected, posed a threat to conceptions of popular sover-
eignty centered in the legislature.
141
 As a result, throughout the late eighteenth 
and into the early nineteenth century, new state governments waged a sustained 
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campaign to remake or even abolish these older institutions. This process began 
in Virginia, where petitioners assailed county courts as “far from being the Rep-
resentatives of the People.”
142
 In 1788, the state legislature, urged by staunch re-
publicans like Thomas Jefferson, established a new separate system of district 
courts overseen by legislatively appointed judges.
143
 The aim was to displace the 
local courts that these republicans saw as the purview of unlettered gentry unfa-
miliar with legal technicalities. They succeeded; according to historians, the act 
destroyed the political influence of JPs and empowered the district courts, espe-
cially because litigants could remove any dispute involving more than thirty dol-
lars to the new courts.
144
 A similar process unfolded in 1780s Massachusetts, 
where the state legislature for the first time intervened in the county court sys-
tem, assuming “most all of the discretionary and rule-making authority of local 
courts.”
145
 In 1804, the state legislature stripped the courts of general sessions of 
their judicial role altogether and transformed them into what Hartog described 
as “mere administrative agencies” exercising delegated legislative power.
146
 
“[T]here was no place for a discretionary problem solver that was not tied to the 
sovereign people of the whole Commonwealth,” Hartog concluded.
147
 “The 
‘public’ for the actions of the court [of general sessions] had become, in effect, 
the General Court”—the Massachusetts state legislature.
148
 
The timeline in North and South Carolina was slower according to Laura 
Edwards’s careful study of those states’ local court records.
149
 Nonetheless, a co-
terie of post-Revolutionary elite lawyers sought to “centralize the operation of 
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By the end of Edwards’s period of study, these lawyers had increasingly suc-
ceeded in displacing the world of customary legal ordering in favor of “state law,” 
a set of statutory rules based on individual-rights-bearing citizens that “com-
peted with localized processes” for authority.
151
 
Similar dynamics marked the contest between legislatures and municipalities 
in the post-Revolutionary era. The question of municipal authority closely par-
alleled the issues surrounding corporations more generally, of which cities were 
an important subset. But the drive to make municipalities more responsive to 
the people—and increasingly subordinate to the state legislature—was arguably 
even stronger in the context of municipalities because of their direct role in gov-
ernance. Although this contest would involve a long and gradual transformation, 
the ideology that undergirded the argument for state legislative supremacy 
emerged very soon after the Revolution. 
In 1792, for instance, a writer styled as “A Town-Born Child” assailed a recent 
critic who had argued that a plan to reform Boston’s government would “be the 
destruction of the Sovereignty of the town.”
152
 The Town-Born Child found this 
puzzling: 
We wish to learn what is meant by the Sovereignty of a town—Sovereignty 
is an uncontroulable absolute power: But a town is a mere creature of legis-
lative authority, and this authority is again a mere creature of the Sover-
eignty of the people’s in a whole State or Commonwealth; and so a town 
can have nothing about it like Sovereign power; it is a corporation hold-
ing certain privileges, regulated by law, and granted by the authority of 
the supreme power and Sovereignty of the State.
153
 
In the coming years, this argument would gain ascendancy throughout the 
United States. By 1802, New Yorkers were proclaiming their municipal govern-
ment a “child and creature of the state” and thus subject to state legislative inter-
ference at will.
154
 Increasingly, the premise that municipal authority was dele-
gated state power—rather than grounded in “[c]ustom, tradition, and local 
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Finally, the post-Revolutionary push against community institutions came 
to target juries and mobs, two traditional bodies of local power. This move was 
ironic because both had been central to colonial resistance to British authority 
during the imperial crisis. Juries were, in the words of one historian, an “adjunct 
of local communities which articulated into positive law the ethical standards of 
those communities,” and so were often free to decide both law and fact.
156
 Their 
prominent role in Revolutionary resistance helps explain their protection within 
the Bill of Rights.
157
 Mobs, although not protected within formal law, nonethe-




Yet to many early Americans, both institutions were increasingly seen as op-
posed to state legislative supremacy. For juries, this shift meant diminishing 
their role to that of factfinder alone, while providing for a variety of alternate 
procedural mechanisms—special verdicts, jury instructions, and particularly 
judgments according to law and motions for new trials—that stripped them of 
control.
159
 Mobs were now cast as undemocratic assaults on duly established 
popular government.
160
 “[M]obs will never do—to govern states or command 
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All these assaults on localist institutions did not mean that local governments 
became irrelevant; on the contrary, historians have demonstrated that they con-
tinued to exercise considerable police powers well into the nineteenth century.
162
 
The key issue in the clash between states and localities was not the extent of gov-
ernment authority but its legitimacy and source—the question, in short, of sov-
ereignty. Pre-Revolutionary thought emphasized localism because it rested on 
an older, early modern logic of uneven and customary law rooted in a particular 
place and community of people. The ascendant post-Revolutionary thought in-
voked the “people,” too, but the people as an abstract, homogeneous collective, 
stripped of particularities, who had empowered state legislatures as the institu-
tional expression of their will. This vision of state legislative supremacy did not 
displace preexisting ideas immediately; it would require a longer struggle to 
overcome older localist logics.
163
 Nonetheless, the ideology of unitary state sov-
ereignty gained currency as a potent tool to argue that localist institutions—local 
courts, municipalities, juries, mobs—previously seen as closely tied to the people 
were, in fact, undemocratic. Paradoxically, a vision of authority as bottom up had 
helped build an ideology in which power flowed from the top down, as states 
claimed supremacy by virtue of their purported monopoly on democratic repre-
sentation. 
C. Native Nations 
Even though their nation was born of an anti-imperial revolt, Anglo-Amer-
icans freely spoke of the new United States as an empire.
164
 The term captured 
their sense of the new nation’s immense scale, which extended to the Mississippi 
River. But the term’s present-day meaning was also apt, since the United States 
from the beginning sought to assert authority over Native peoples who never 
consented to their incorporation in the nation’s territory and who were excluded 
from Anglo-American institutions of governance. 
States early on became the principal proponents and actors in the new na-
tion’s colonial project of dispossessing Native peoples. All of the country’s vast 
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expanse ostensibly fell within the borders of existing states, many of which as-
serted dubious charter rights extending all the way to the Pacific. Such claims 
were laughable: at the time of the Revolution, state sovereignty in the enormous 
regions west of the Appalachians, where mere handfuls of Anglo-Americans 
lived, was purely notional. Native nations unquestionably remained this terri-
tory’s most consequential sovereigns. 
Yet this reality did little to halt states’ assertions of sweeping territorial sov-
ereignty. Two of the largest states, Virginia and North Carolina, included provi-
sions in their new constitutions that codified their charter boundaries.
165
 Their 
only acknowledgments that their supposed territory was already inhabited were 
constitutional provisions prohibiting private purchases of Indian lands—re-
strictions that further empowered state governments and demonstrated their in-
tent to claim broad authority to regulate their entire territories.
166
 
Such provisions prefigured what would become an aggressive effort by state 
legislatures to deploy the new ideology of popular sovereignty to assert authority 
over the Native nations within their borders.
167
 The first rumblings over this 
question came during the drafting of the Articles of Confederation, when several 
states objected to proposals that would have granted the national government 
sole authority over Indian affairs.
168
 The final document instead codified ambig-
uous language that barred the national government’s authority in Indian affairs 
from “infring[ing]” on each state’s “legislative right . . . within its own limits” 
and from regulating Indians who were “members of any of the states.”
169
 
States quickly seized on this provision as authorizing expansive control over 
the Native nations within their borders. Their principal aim was to divest tribes 
of as much land as possible in order to placate their property-hungry citizens. 
But the states’ vision also swept much more broadly: it proposed nothing less 
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than eliminating the rights to sovereignty and self-governance that Native peo-
ples had enjoyed under the British Empire.
170
 States would instead assume firm 
control over Natives within their borders, in large part by transforming them 
from members of sovereign nations into detribalized subjects. New York should 
abandon holding treaties and cease referring to the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) 
tribes as nations, one New York congressman advocated.
171
 Native peoples, he 
urged, should be regarded simply as state “[m]embers,” and he would negotiate 
with them “as if I was actually transacting Business with the Citizens.”
172
 
Similar arguments appeared to the south, as states sought to use their new 
constitutions as weapons to dispossess Natives. In Georgia, state officials badg-
ered a small delegation of Creeks into signing a treaty, the first article of which 
stated that “the said Indians . . . within the limits of the State of Georgia, have 
been and now are members of the same (since the day and date of the Constitu-
tion of the said State of Georgia).”
173
 The state legislature also established new 
counties in unpurchased Indian territory without any acknowledgment of exist-
ing Native sovereignty.
174
 In North Carolina, the state legislature dispensed with 
treaties altogether: it enacted a statute that set aside a small portion of land for 
the Cherokees and then opened the rest for settlement by the state’s citizens.
175
 
The logic, according to one observer, was that the state “claim[s] all the Land 




In the short term, these state claims were self-defeating: states’ reckless dis-
regard of Native sovereignty badly misread the balance of power and threatened 
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wars that neither the states nor the federal government could afford to fight.
177
 
The outcome, as I have explored elsewhere, was the adoption of a Constitution 
that codified exclusive federal authority over Indian affairs.
178
 But even after rat-
ification, states like New York and Georgia continued to insist on their sovereign 
rights to govern their entire territories, including the Native peoples within 
them.
179
 The question of Native status within a federalist system, in short, per-
sisted and would later reemerge with even greater force. 
Although little discussed among present-day public law scholars, these early 
fights over Native authority reveal much about federalism’s nature during its 
early, tentative development. In theory, federalism as an ideology of divisible 
sovereignty might have proved a boon for Native nations: if sovereignty did not 
have to be unitary, then it was possible for the United States to acknowledge 
Native sovereignty while also defending its paramount sovereignty. In fact, the 
legal status that the Washington Administration envisioned for Native nations 
bore some similarity to the position of states in the new constitutional order.
180
 
But early American federalism as actually practiced created little conceptual space 
for Native sovereignty. If anything, it foreclosed it, as states invoked the legiti-
macy supposedly conferred by their new constitutions to claim supremacy 
throughout their vast territories, even over peoples who had no hand in these 
documents’ creations. Once again, federalism facilitated new and more aggres-
sive claims of sovereignty against states’ competitors. 
D. Secessionists 
Natives were not the only people in the states’ western territories. After the 
Revolution, the westward trickle of Anglo-American settlers across the Appala-
chians became a torrent. The “Spirit of Emigration rages to an immense degree,” 
reported one observer.
181
 “[T]he old States must certainly be drained of their 
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 By the late 1780s, the so-called “western waters,” previously 
nearly devoid of white residents, contained tens of thousands of U.S. citizens.
183
 
The future of these regions was one of the most important constitutional 
questions in the early United States. Nearly all Anglo-Americans believed that, 
at some point, new states would be carved from the existing ones.
184
 Both North 
Carolina and Virginia’s constitutions provided that new states could be created 
in the West with the consent of the existing state’s legislature.
185
 In 1784, Con-
gress, having earlier urged states to cede their western lands to the federal gov-
ernment, created its first plan to divide transferred lands into future states.
186
 
But while many states gave up their lands, others—including North Carolina, 




The Anglo-Americans living in these regions rarely welcomed the continued 
authority of distant state governments. In their view, states provided few ser-
vices—failing to establish courts or provide protection against Native nations 
angered by state land grabs—even as state legislatures happily pillaged these re-
gions through sale or grant to repay Revolutionary War debts.
188
 The result was 
widespread discontent with state rule. 
This anger found institutional form in widespread invocations of popular 
sovereignty and the right to self-determination. In particular, the broad lan-
guage of the Declaration of Independence provided a powerful intellectual tool 
for those who argued that inadequate protection justified separation. But, not-
withstanding occasional flirtation with a British or Spanish alliance, these dis-
gruntled western settlers did not seek secession from the United States.
189
 Ra-
ther, they sought to fulfill a promise that was also widespread in Revolutionary 
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thought. “[A]ll men have a natural inherent right,” read the 1776 Pennsylvania 
Bill of Rights, “to form a new state in vacant countries, or in such countries as 
they can purchase, whenever they think that thereby they may promote their 
own happiness.”
190
 Western settlers interpreted the term “state” in such prom-
ises in the domestic sense—as meaning that they possessed the right to become 
a new state within the United States. 
For settlers angered by state governments’ perceived neglect, the prospect of 
separate statehood within the union was irresistible. These would-be state build-
ers were, after all, merely hastening a process that everyone conceded must take 
place eventually. During and after the Revolution, then, existing states con-
fronted a rash of secessionist movements within their territories. As one con-




The process began with Vermont, ostensibly part of New York. Seeking to 
protect land titles derived from New Hampshire, Vermont’s residents quickly 
grasped the emancipatory potential of Revolutionary ideals and, in 1777, gath-
ered to draft a constitution.
192
 The resulting document was explicit about its in-
tellectual foundations: it began with a near-verbatim copy of the Declaration of 
Independence, although it reworked the litany of complaints to attack abuses by 
the “legislature of New-York” rather than the King.
193
 The proclamation ended 
by insisting that any new government in Vermont must be “derived from, and 
founded on, the authority of the people only”—but, lest this be understood as a 
claim to complete independence, the sentence finished, “agreeable to the direc-
tion of the honorable American Congress.”
194
 
Vermont’s status remained uncertain well into the 1780s, as New York stren-
uously maintained its claim and Congress dithered.
195
 Yet what Thomas Jeffer-
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son labeled the “Vermont doctrine”—“that any portion of what had been an in-
tegral state had . . . a right to assume a separate existence, and to govern them-
selves”—spread to other regions.
196
 One congressman complained that the 
would-be state “furnish[ed] a fatal example to the Union,” such that “the desire 
of dismembering States prevails in so great a degree among the citizens of the 
Union.”
197
 There were soon rumblings of secession in the so-called Kentucky 
district of Virginia and in the eastern townships of Massachusetts, which would, 
much later, become the state of Maine.
198
 
But the most determined push for secession appeared in western North Car-
olina, beyond the Smoky Mountains, a region that the white settlers now pro-
claimed as the new state of Franklin.
199
 Like Vermont, Franklin drew explicit 
support from Revolutionary principles of self-determination. During the debate 
over separation, one delegate literally drew a copy of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence from his pocket to invoke its authority; the convention delegates then 
immediately voted in favor of independence.
200
 These justifications soon ap-
peared in the would-be state’s new constitution, which, like Vermont’s, was 
modeled on the Declaration and contained a paean to popular sovereignty.
201
 
Franklin’s leaders also penned petitions to Congress and to North Carolina vin-
dicating their project, appealing to the “world . . . to judge whither we ask more 
than free people ought to claim agreeable to Republican principles, the grand 
foundation whereon our American fabric now stands.”
202
 Outside of formal doc-
uments, some Franklinites put their claim to self-governance more boldly. 
“[T]hey Had Knowledge Enough to Judge for themselves,” one Franklin booster 
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announced, “that they should not ask North Carolina Nor no other person how 
they ware to B. Governd.”
203
 
Outside observers feared the decentralizing consequences of such a broad 
and radical concept of self-determination. North Carolina’s governor denounced 
the Franklinites’ “rash and irregular conduct,” which, he warned, established “a 
precedent . . . for every District and even every County of the State to claim the 
right of separation and Independency for any supposed grievance of the Inhab-
itants, as caprice, pride and ambition shall dictate at pleasure.”
204
 Neighbors in 
the enormous, unwieldy state of Virginia were equally concerned. “[I]f a doc-
trine of this sort is allowed,” warned Virginia Congressman William Grayson, 
“it will go directly to the destruction of all government for if the right exists in 
the first instance it may be carried so far as to reduce a State to the size of a county 
or a parish.”
205
 Even the arch-republican Jefferson, frankly admitting his anxie-
ties for Virginia, feared that “our several states will crumble to atoms by the spirit 
of establishing every little canton into a separate state.”
206
 
Yet fears about the fragmentation of political authority could not justify why 
state governments alone possessed the legitimate right to govern. Secessionists’ 
opponents offered what they thought to be a compelling answer: the legitimate 
authority of the state constitutions. North Carolina’s governor described Frank-
lin as a “self-created power and authority unknown to the Constitution of the 
State, and not sanctified by the Legislature.”
207
 Virginia’s legislature enacted a 
law making it an act of “high treason” to attempt to establish “any government 
separate from or independent of the goverment [sic] of Virginia.”
208
 The stat-
ute’s preamble justified the law by insisting that the state’s “constitution, sover-
eignty, and independence . . . should at all times be maintained and sup-
ported.”
209
 At their core, these arguments rested on the premise that the state 
constitutions had made the state legislatures the sole repositories of popular sov-
ereignty. 
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This claim, however, was difficult to sustain against the secessionists, who 
questioned why their constitutions and legislatures did not enjoy equal right to 
speak on the people’s behalf. With neither side willing to concede the other’s 
legitimate authority, these contests over sovereignty threatened to devolve into 
violence. Virginia’s statute authorized use of the militia to suppress would-be 
secessionists,
210
 while Vermonters spoke openly about using force to repel any 
effort by New York to assert jurisdiction.
211
 In North Carolina, the prospect of a 
“civil war” was not merely hypothetical.
212
 In the 1788 Battle of Franklin, armed 
pro- and antistatehood parties clashed, leaving three dead.
213
 
These conflicts over secession, coming in the midst of the debates over the 
drafting and ratification of the Federal Constitution, demonstrated deep ten-
sions in how popular sovereignty would function. Nearly everyone, including 
the leaders of existing states, acknowledged that the vast western expanses must 
eventually become separate states. Moreover, proponents of Vermont, Kentucky, 
and Franklin considered themselves, with some justification, the heirs of the 
Revolution’s principle of self-determination: they, too, could point to constitu-
tive written acts of popular sovereignty that granted them legitimate authority. 
Yet, despite these compelling arguments, New York, Virginia, and especially 
North Carolina fought fiercely to suppress any suggestion that separation could 
occur without their approval and consent. Their persistence arguably had little 
to do with any deep desire to govern these territories—which, in the 1790s, they 
would readily relinquish. At stake, rather, was the question of sovereignty. State 
charters and constitutions, state leaders insisted, elevated their legislatures to the 
position of ultimate authority over the state’s territory, however broadly and ha-
zily defined. Any separation could take place only on the legislature’s terms. 
E. Shays’s Rebellion 
On August 22, 1786, a convention of delegates elected in town meetings 
across Hampshire County met in Hatfield, Massachusetts.
214
 In its first act of 
business, the convention “voted that this meeting is constitutional.”
215
 The del-
egates then drafted a list of seventeen different grievances, most focused on an 
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unresponsive, undemocratic, and distant state legislature, as well as a legal sys-
tem they regarded as hostile to their interests.
216
 
Although similar county conventions were held across Massachusetts in the 
summer of 1786, the Hampshire meeting yielded the most immediate results.
217
 
One week after the convention, hundreds of men, many armed, gathered in the 
town of Northampton. Conducting themselves with “sobriety and good or-
der”
218
 and marching to fife and drum, they successfully demanded that court 
business cease until their grievances were redressed.
219
 Soon, similar assemblies 
were closing courts across the state. 
This movement ultimately became known as Shays’s Rebellion—the label 
affixed to it by its opponents, who used the name of one of its reluctant leaders. 
But the movement’s participants used different terms, referring to themselves as 
the Regulators or sometimes “a body of the people.”
220
 As these names suggest, 
the protestors’ critique of state authority drew on multiple understandings of 
sovereignty in the era’s thought. In their use of town meetings and organized 
county conventions to legitimate their grievances, the Regulators invoked the 
longstanding link between localism and popular sovereignty.
221
 In their armed 
yet somber mass mobilization, the protestors harked back to the established role 
of mobs and militia in expressing community opinion.
222
 And in their attack on 
the failure of distant elites in Boston to represent their interests, the insurgents 
echoed the lines of criticism that, in Franklin, Vermont, and Kentucky, culmi-
nated in full-blown demands for independent statehood.
223
 
The movement’s opponents, however, did not recognize any of these sources 
as a basis for legitimate authority. To their minds, there was a single source of 
sovereignty in Massachusetts, the state constitution, which vested authority and 
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the right to speak on behalf of the people in a single institution, the state legis-
lature. “County Conventions are a body unknown to the constitution of this 
commonwealth,” wrote one author outraged by the Hampshire Convention.
224
 
“[W]hen they assume to give law or direction to the people, or to any branch of 
government, they usurp the lawful powers of the legislature and are guilty of 
injuring the majesty of the people.”
225
 The conventions’ actions similarly in-
censed a rising young lawyer named Fisher Ames. “[T]he supreme power is re-
ally held by the legal representatives of the people,” Ames insisted.
226
 “[C]ounty 
conventions and riotous assemblies of armed men shall no longer be allowed to 
legislate, and to form an imperium in imperio . . . .”
227
 
Ultimately, these critics’ views prevailed, although only after much difficulty. 
The national government sought to raise troops to suppress the protests, but it 
lacked the funds to do so.
228
 Unable to rely on the militia, Massachusetts’s gov-
ernor was reduced to depending on wealthy Bostonians to fund a force of eastern 
militia, which eventually suppressed the insurgents.
229
 Although most partici-
pants were pardoned, several leaders were sentenced to death, with two eventu-
ally hanged for their role in the insurgency.
230
 
Shays’s purported rebellion encapsulated the confrontations over sover-
eignty that marked the critical period of the 1780s. The legal principles the Reg-
ulators invoked were not new: they rested on understandings of authority as 
local, plural, and institutionally grounded that were commonplace, even banal, 
in early America—ideas that had helped justify Revolutionary resistance.
231
 But 
these concepts were at odds with a growing ideology of legislative supremacy 
grounded in popular sovereignty. The possibility that other institutions might 
legitimately speak for the people panicked state leaders. Such principles would 
act “in Subversion of all order and government,” opined the Massachusetts leg-
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Anxiety over events in Massachusetts extended well beyond the state. As has 
been well documented, the insurgency strengthened calls for a stronger national 
government to replace the ineffectual Continental Congress and helped draw 
George Washington from retirement to preside over the Constitutional Conven-
tion.
233
 The specter of Daniel Shays came to haunt both the Constitution’s draft-
ing and the ensuing debates over ratification. 
But the lessons early Americans drew from events in Massachusetts were 
more complicated than a simple story about the shortcomings of a weak national 
government. The county conventions, after all, said almost nothing about na-
tional power; they focused their ire on the state legislature and the state consti-
tution. The argument for a stronger federal government in response to Shays’s 
Rebellion rested on the assumption that such a government would bolster and 
protect states from the competing sources of authority invoked by the insurgency. 
“It is time to render the federal head supreme in the United States,” Fisher Ames 
opined in one of his attacks on the insurgents.
234
 “It is also time to render the 
general court supreme in Massachusetts.”
235
 This linkage persisted in the ensu-
ing Constitutional Convention, producing a document that arguably sought to 
accomplish both of Ames’s goals. 
i i i .  constitutionalizing dual sovereignty 
Two accounts dominate interpretations of federalism and the Constitution’s 
creation. One is nationalist: it emphasizes how the document’s drafters sought 
to repair the perversities of the Articles of Confederation by empowering the na-
tional government and, just as significantly, to place firm limits on state legisla-
tures, which had seemingly run roughshod over minority rights, especially eco-
nomic rights, in the years following the Revolution.
236
 This account finds 
support most explicitly in the Supremacy Clause,
237
 but also in Article I, Section 
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10 of the Constitution, which placed explicit limits on state power.
238
 The other 
narrative stresses what would become known as states’ rights. It emphasizes how 
the document ensured that the states retained sovereignty as a shield against 
possible federal overreach.
239
 Here, the key provisions are primarily structural—
the creation of a federal government with only “limited and enumerated pow-
ers,”
240
 the role of the states in the makeup and selection of the Senate,
241
 the 
intricacies of the amendment process,
242
 and the Tenth Amendment, which was 
adopted to allay Antifederalist fears of “consolidation.”
243
 
This Part offers a third way to interpret the relationship between the Consti-
tution and federalism: that the document’s drafters expanded federal authority 
in part to protect state sovereignty.
244
 By 1787, the states’ status as sovereigns was 
both well established by a decade of precedent and yet arguably still precarious. 
Although most delegates to the Convention assumed that sovereign states would 
remain the foundation for the new union, the most nationalist delegates argued 
for the abolition of the states altogether.
245
 While these proposals gained little 
traction, they suggest that state sovereignty was not the unquestioned principle 
of constitutional thought it would later become. For most delegates, however, 
there was a more immediate threat to state authority: the risk, borne out by the 
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preceding decade, that internal dissensions might overthrow state power alto-
gether.
246
 Many delegates accordingly sought to create a federal government that 
would protect state power against these potential challengers. 
Discussion of this aim did not supplant, but coexisted alongside, concerns 
about state and federal overreach, with all three issues swirling together during 
the debates at the Convention and during ratification. Like these other, better-
known concerns, the desire for expanded federal authority to protect states ar-
guably resulted in concrete constitutional provisions that manifested this pur-
pose. Here, I focus on two in particular—what have come to be known as the 
Guarantee Clause
247
 and the New State Clause.
248
 Both were understood at the 
time to pledge federal support to states against their would-be competitors. 
A. Protecting State Power at the Constitutional Convention 
In April 1787, James Madison penned some notes on what he labeled the 
“Vices of the Political System of the United States.”
249
 The document, which has 
become a touchstone for understanding the Constitutional Convention, made 
clear Madison’s hostility to the excesses of the state legislatures, cataloging at 
length the “multiplicity,” “mutability,” and “injustice” of state laws.
250
 Yet tucked 
in among the list of vices was also his lament over the “want of Guaranty to the 
States of their Constitutions & laws against internal violence” in the Articles of 
Confederation.
251
 Madison’s fear was that an armed and determined minority 
could “overmatch” the majority and place itself in authority.
252
 
The immediate context for Madison’s remarks was likely Shays’s Rebellion, 
but others had used similar language in the context of other challenges to state 
authority. Writing even as the Convention sat, Virginia Congressman William 
Grayson insisted, “There can be no doubt but that the United States are bound 
to guaranty the limits of every State.”
253
 His concern was the bevy of secessionist 
movements challenging state authority, but he, too, relied on the term “guaran-
tee” to capture what he sought from a federal government—a promise noticeably 
lacking in the Articles of Confederation. 
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Grayson and Madison’s concern that the federal government should protect 
state authority and territory carried into the drafting of the Constitution. Ulti-
mately, these anxieties produced two provisions—the Guarantee and New State 
Clauses—that the drafters believed enlisted federal authority to aid states against 
potential challenges to their authority. 
1. The Guarantee Clause 
At the time of the Constitution’s drafting, the word “guarantee” carried some 
of the same connotations as it does now, but it was more firmly rooted in a legal 
context. It was ubiquitous in the era’s documents of high diplomacy, as nations 
routinely guaranteed each other’s lands and sovereignty in treaty provisions.
254
 
Noah Webster defined this sense of the word as “to secure to another, at all 
events, as claims, rights, or possessions.”
255
 
Proposals to codify some sort of “guaranty” by the federal government of the 
states in the constitutional text came on the first day of substantive discussion at 
the Convention. The Virginia Plan included a provision that the “Republican 
Government & the territory of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary 
junction of Government & territory, ought to be guaranteed by the United States 
to each State.”
256
 But the proposal’s language slowly evolved. On June 11, one 
delegate objected to “guarantying territory” as a “perpetual source of discord,” 
while James Madison sought to expand voluntary junction to include voluntary 
partition.
257
 In response, the Convention unanimously agreed to alter the guar-
antee to encompass only “a Republican Constitution & its existing laws,” elimi-
nating all references to territory.
258
 
As the delegates debated this new language, they read it principally as a pro-
tection for states, interpreting it in light of the earlier, more explicit proposals to 
codify state constitutions and territories.
259
 The provision’s “object,” observed 
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James Wilson, “is merely to secure the States agst. dangerous commotions, in-
surrections and rebellions.”
260
 Haunting the entire debate was the specter of 
Shays’s Rebellion, to which one delegate explicitly referred.
261
 
Yet not all the delegates embraced the idea that the federal government 
should intervene on behalf of the status quo. Some, expressing strong dislike for 
existing state laws and constitutions, objected to their inclusion in the clause.
262
 
Others, including Luther Martin of Maryland, disagreed about when and how 
the federal government should employ force to protect state authority. One del-
egate feared that the national government would be forced “to decide between 
contending parties each of which claim the sanction of the Constitution.”
263
 De-
spite these objections, the delegates ultimately agreed to a provision promising 
that the federal government “shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Re-
publican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; 
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature 
cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.”
264
 
2. The New State Clause 
As the debates over the Guarantee Clause suggested, the question of state 
authority was closely tied up with the issue of territory. Delegates from states 
that retained expansive western lands, particularly North Carolina and Georgia, 
were especially eager to protect their claimed territory from potential encroach-
ment. One provision, adopted after substantial back and forth, stipulated that 
nothing in the Constitution undermined states’ claims to western lands, thus 
beating back an attempt by small-state advocates to establish federal owner-
ship.
265
 But delegates from states with western land claims sought more than 
federal noninterference; they wanted a constitutional bar that would forestall 
secessionist movements. They accordingly made a controversial proposal that 
Congress’s power to admit new states—which already existed under the Arti-
cles—be amended so that new states “within the limits of any of the present 
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This proposal to give existing states a trump over new states’ admission 
prompted a highly charged debate with explicit references to Vermont, Ken-
tucky, and Franklin.
267
 On one side were those who, like state officials, foresaw 
anarchy from the prospect of endless secessions. If new states were permitted 
within existing states without their consent, “nothing but confusion would en-
sue,” warned Pierce Butler of South Carolina.
268
 “Whenever taxes should press 
on the people, demagogues would set up their schemes of new States.”
269
 (Butler 
apparently failed to catch the irony of objecting to secession as the product of a 
tax revolt.) James Wilson offered the proposal’s most sophisticated defense, 
grounded in conceptions of popular sovereignty and majoritarian rule. Under 
the proposal, Wilson observed, if a “majority of the State wish to divide they can 
do so,” but he was opposed to the suggestion that the “Genl Government should 
abet the minority.”
270
 There was, he insisted, “nothing that would give greater or 
juster alarm than the doctrine, that a political society is to be torne asunder with-
out its own consent.”
271
 
The measure’s opponents were not persuaded. Some, like John Dickinson of 
Delaware, saw the measure as nothing more than an attempt to force all the 
states to protect large states’ “extensive claims of territory.”
272
 But the most in-
teresting response came from Luther Martin, who pointed out Wilson’s hypoc-
risy for suddenly discovering a solicitude for states as natural political societies, 
a concern he had allegedly lacked during the debate over representation.
273
 As 
Martin pointed out, the large states’ capacious and arbitrary boundaries enfolded 
regions with few geographic or economic ties.
274
 The proposal would condemn 
these regions—Martin specifically mentioned the “Western People” of Virginia, 
North Carolina, and Georgia as well as those living in Maine—to rule by distant 
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Martin’s objections to the New State Clause had no more effect than his chal-
lenge to the Guarantee Clause. The provision that “no new State shall be formed 
or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State . . . without the Consent of 




3. Intent and Text 
The adoption of the Guarantee and New State Clauses represented an im-
portant victory for those who sought to codify protections for state authority. 
Both Clauses specifically committed the federal government to support existing 
state authority, and both granted considerable decision-making power to state 
legislatures. These proposals had proved controversial, provoking some of the 
most sustained debate during the Convention, as many delegates pointed to 
what they believed to be the abuses of state authority under the Articles. Yet in 
the end more delegates had come to Philadelphia partly, as Madison’s Vices sug-
gested, to secure support for state authority. The document they created fulfilled 
some of their aspirations. 
But only some, as the debates at the Convention had cabined these advocates’ 
success. The final version of the Guarantee Clause, for instance, was much less 
capacious in its protections than the original proposals were: it did not protect 
states’ “Constitutional authority,”
277
 as Madison had at one point proposed, nor 
did it explicitly guard state territory. The resulting text was so ambiguous that 
what the delegates primarily intended as a protection for state authority could be 
plausibly read, as many scholars have done, as a restriction on states.
278
 The New 
State Clause was at once clearer and narrower: although it resembled the terri-
torial protections that states had sought, it specifically prohibited only secession 
without state consent. 
The proposed Constitution, then, reflected only imperfectly what seemed a 
rough agreement in the Convention for using federal power to protect state au-
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thority. Opponents were outspoken and influential enough to yield a compro-
mise document that, while it resembled the promise that state advocates had 
sought, actually committed the federal government to very little. This tension 
between intent and text played out even more fully during the ratification de-
bates that followed. 
B. Ratification 
“[C]onsolidation”—the prospect that the new federal government would 
destroy the “states as independent, autonomous jurisdictions”—was, historian 
Jack Rakove has argued, “the chief evil that Anti-Federalists ascribed to the Con-
stitution.”
279
 Unsurprisingly, then, discussions of federalism dominated the ex-
tensive debates over ratification that followed the Constitutional Convention. As 
the Constitution’s critics vociferously defended state independence and sover-
eignty, ratification’s Federalist proponents sought to downplay the Constitu-
tion’s threat to state autonomy, speaking far more circumspectly about state au-
thority than the delegates to the Convention had. 
These dynamics pushed the ratification debates onto seemingly shared argu-
mentative terrain: if only out of expediency, Federalists outwardly agreed with 
Antifederalists on the need for federal power to preserve state sovereignty 
against potential competitors. But they disagreed over whether the Constitution 
actually achieved this supposedly shared goal. This framing had divergent con-
sequences for the Guarantee and New State Clauses during ratification. The 
Guarantee Clause proved a key point of contention: Federalists routinely in-
voked it as proof against charges of consolidation, only for Antifederalists to re-
spond that the Clause’s text did not support the Federalists’ broad claims. By 
contrast, unlike the heated discussions it elicited during the Convention, the 
New State Clause, with its unambiguous textual support for states, proved 
largely uncontroversial. 
1. The Guarantee Clause 
The Guarantee Clause was much debated during ratification, and for a clear 
reason. Because it contained the Constitution’s most explicit codification of state 
authority, the Guarantee Clause gave Federalists a useful tool to rebut Antifed-
eralists’ allegations that the Constitution would destroy the states. Here was 
 




proof, Federalists insisted, that the “danger of our state governments being an-
nihilated” was illusory,
280
 and that the Constitution would not “infring[e] upon 
the internal police of the states.”
281
 
In making this case, Federalists repeatedly stressed two aspects of the Clause. 
First, they argued that the Clause afforded greater protection to states than ex-
isted under the Articles because it pledged them federal support. Echoing dis-
cussions at the Convention, ratification’s proponents noted that states’ rights 
would be now be “guaranteed by the whole empire”
282
 and would receive a “con-
tinental confirmation.”
283
 Second, the Federalists claimed that the Clause pro-
vided states such robust protections as to obviate the bill of rights that the Anti-
federalists constantly harped on. The Guarantee Clause was a “constitutional 
security far superior to the fancied advantages of a bill of rights,” Jasper Yeates 
argued at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention; it clearly “assure[d] us of the 
intention of the framers of this Constitution, to preserve the individual sover-
eignty and independence of the states inviolate.”
284
 The Maryland writer 
Aristedes labeled all of Article IV “a declaration of governmental rights” because 
it contained “[t]he guarantee of a distinct republican government to each state, 
and a variety of other state rights are expressly provided for.”
285
 
In response, Antifederalists pointed out the gap between the Federalists’ 
rhetoric and the Guarantee Clause’s actual text. The Federalists spoke as though 
the Clause contained all the language discussed, but ultimately omitted, at the 
Convention—protections of state sovereignty, independence, and constitutional 
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authority. Yet these words, while part of the Articles, appeared nowhere in the 
new Constitution, including in the Guarantee Clause. “The sovereignty of the 
states is not expressly reserved,” one critic noted of the Clause. 
“[T]he form only, and not the SUBSTANCE of their government, is guaran-
teed to them by express words.”
286
 Perhaps if the Constitution had codified the 
Convention’s original proposal to guarantee states’ constitutions and existing 




Ultimately, the Antifederalists were united in their view that the Guarantee 
Clause was inadequate: the promise of a republican “form,” they insisted, was a 
weaselly word that offered little actual protection.
288
 What they sought was not 
elimination but expansion of the Clause—the creation of a more substantive fed-
eral promise that would specifically use the words they thought necessary to 
guard states’ rights. When Rhode Islanders insisted on a series of changes, the 
first proposed amendment was a much-expanded version of the Clause: “The 
United States shall guarantee to each State its sovereignty, freedom and inde-
pendence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this Consti-
tution expressly delegated to the United States.”
289
 
2. The New State Clause 
In contrast to the Guarantee Clause, the New State Clause elicited relatively 
little attention during ratification. Most commentators who discussed the Clause 
argued, like James Madison in The Federalist, that it simply clarified Congress’s 
power under the Articles.
290
 As for the prohibition on secession, it merely, in 
Madison’s words, “quiets the jealousy of the larger States.”
291
 Federalists at 
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times exploited that jealousy in pressing their case for the Constitution. “How 
has it happened . . . that Vermont is at this moment an independent State?” Rob-
ert Livingston queried at the New York Convention when illustrating the short-
comings of the Articles.
292
 “How has it happened that new States have arisen in 
the West, & in the heart of other States[?]”
293
 One Massachusetts author argued 
that the Clause secured “the peace and happiness of the states”: it “entirely de-
feated” those “who wish to effect the disunion of the states, in order to get them-




Even as Federalists embraced the New State Clause, comparatively few An-
tifederalists opposed it. Yet there was one vocal opponent: Luther Martin. In a 
widely reprinted speech to Maryland’s legislature, Martin reprised and expanded 
his critiques from the Convention, describing the continued subjugation of 
western settlers to grossly oversized states as an “ignominious . . . yoke” that 
might justify armed resistance.
295
 But, should these frustrated citizens challenge 
state jurisdiction, the Guarantee Clause had “pledged” states “the whole force of 
the United States” to protect “even in the extremest part of their territory” from 
uprising.
296
 “[T]he State of Maryland may, and probably will be called upon to 
assist with her wealth and her blood in subduing the inhabitants of Franklin, 
Kentucky, Vermont, and the provinces of Main and Sagadohock,” Martin fore-
saw, “and in compelling them to continue in subjection to the States which re-
spectively claim jurisdiction over them.”
297
 
Martin’s plea was a lonely one. A handful of other critics voiced similar con-
cerns that the New State Clause, coupled with the promise of federal aid, would 
encourage states to maintain extravagant territorial claims.
298
 And one group of 
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westerners published a revised version of the Constitution that would have 
stripped Congress’s power to admit states altogether in favor of automatic ad-
mission once would-be states (including, presumably, those within existing 
states) reached a requisite population.
299
 But few others seemed to share Mar-
tin’s anxiety that the Constitution condemned western settlers to the continued 
unwelcome rule of states they rejected. 
3. State Sovereignty and the Ratification Debates 
The ratification debates were as significant for demonstrating agreement as 
for highlighting contention. In contrast with the Convention, there seemed to 
be widespread consensus that using federal power to shield state sovereignty was 
a laudable goal. This understanding helps explain why the New State Clause 
received so little attention while, paradoxically, the Guarantee Clause received so 
much, with both sides contesting whether it in fact served to protect state au-
thority. 
This framing reflected politics as much as principle. To succeed, Federalists 
had to win over state ratification conventions, many dominated by the same state 
political elites who had long sought to bolster their own authority. By contrast, 
those who challenged or denied state authority—Natives, leaders of Franklin and 
Vermont, Daniel Shays—were excluded. The result was that, although Federal-
ists and Antifederalists sharply disagreed about where to draw the line between 
federal and state authority, both came to emphasize the role of federal power in 
guarding states. 
This dynamic shaped the meaning of the document being debated. In part, 
the change was textual: the enactment of the Bill of Rights and particularly the 
Tenth Amendment seemed to address some of the anxieties over consolidation, 
even though the Amendment’s text was arguably even more ambiguous than the 
Guarantee Clause. But even when the text remained unchanged, ratification 
shaped perceptions of the Constitution’s purpose. As their critics pointed out, 
Federalists, in selling the Constitution, figuratively rewrote its text, speaking as 
though it contained the more robust protections of state sovereignty that the 
Convention had rejected. The consequence was the belated vindication of advo-
cates of federal power in the service of state authority, as the ratification debates 
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helped entrench a frame of dual sovereignty that advocates had only partially 
succeeded in writing into the constitutional text. 
iv.  aftermath: the arrival of dual federalism 
Ratification did not freeze federalism. If anything, the doctrine was in its in-
fancy: its meaning and contours would be heavily shaped by frequent and in-
tense fights over sovereignty in the early United States. Most scholarship has 
focused on the era’s bitter struggles between federal and state authority,
300
 yet 
the earlier conflicts between states and their would-be competitors persisted af-
ter ratification, too. Although tracing the full history of these confrontations lies 
outside the scope of this Article, this Part selectively explores three important 
contests over nonstate sovereignty in the antebellum United States, involving 
corporate rights, populist challenges to state authority, and Indian Removal. My 
goal in this brief glimpse of ratification’s aftermath is to highlight both continu-
ity and change, suggesting some of the ways that dual sovereignty altered the 
jurisprudential landscape. 
One significant change concerned the viable methods of contesting state au-
thority, in particular the decline of armed resistance and the rise of judicial re-
view. The threat of violence persisted after ratification, but now it was directed 
principally against Native peoples, secessionists, and populist rebels, who recog-
nized that they could not easily prevail against states backed by a newly strength-
ened federal military.
301
 Petitioning, another common method of political en-
gagement in the early United States, required supplicating the very legislatures 
whose authority was being challenged.
302
 By contrast, the developing idea of 
courts as an independent check on legislative supremacy
303
—and perhaps, as Al-
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ison LaCroix has suggested, as the institutions the Constitution intended to po-
lice sovereignty disputes
304
—seemed to offer a viable way to contest state author-
ity without bloodshed. 
The result was that many antebellum disputes between states and their com-
petitors began as political struggles but ended as judicial decisions. These were 
rarely state court decisions: opponents of state authority were, with justification, 
skeptical of state courts, which often rubber-stamped legislatures’ actions. In-
stead, many turned to the supposedly more neutral forum of the federal courts, 
and often, ultimately, to the U.S. Supreme Court. As I explore, some of the 
Court’s most significant antebellum rulings sought to arbitrate between states 
and their competitors. 
Yet relying on federal courts to resist state authority had important conse-
quences. In particular, it reinforced the frame of dual sovereignty. To prevail, 
states and their competitors had to ground their claims in the multivalent lan-
guage of the Constitution, which enlisted federal power both as a guarantee of 
states’ authority and as a bulwark against state overreach. The result trans-
formed these struggles into legal contests over which entity had the best claim 
to federal support. Sometimes, states’ competitors won. But these victories did 
not rest on a pre-Revolution logic of separate autonomy grounded in an inde-
pendent source of popular authority; they relied, of necessity, on the vindication 
of federal rights that could be asserted against states. The ratification of the Con-
stitution, in short, helped cement a structure in which claims to authority were 
increasingly interpreted as derivative of either federal or state sovereignty. 
A. Public and Private Corporations 
After ratification, fights over corporate rights continued unabated. Anti-
charter advocates continued to emphasize the supremacy of state legislatures to 
alter corporations at will, while corporations stressed the sanctity of their char-
ters as a form of “vested right” that, once granted, could not be modified.
305
 Early 
on, this contest raged most fiercely in cities like New York and Philadelphia, 
where state legislatures repeatedly intervened in municipal governance.
306
 But as 
 
304. LACROIX, supra note 5, at 169-73. But see Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084 (2010) (reviewing id.) (challenging LaCroix’s claim that 
the courts were the intended venue to resolve sovereignty disputes). 
305. On the doctrine of “vested rights” in this era, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & 
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 
185-204 (1997); and HOBSON, supra note 174, at 128-34. 
306. TEAFORD, supra note 121, at 82-89. 
empire states 
1849 
legislatures expanded their reach to nonprofit and business corporations, strug-
gles over charter rights quickly came to encompass such organizations as well.
307
 
While these conflicts between states and corporations resembled preratifica-
tion contests, the Constitution significantly altered the terms of the debate. In 
particular, the Contracts Clause, which forbade state laws “impairing the obli-
gation of contracts,” seemed to codify the vested-rights doctrine.
308
 Soon, cor-
porations of all sorts were arguing that their charters were contracts that state 
legislatures could not modify. 
The mixed success of these Contracts Clause arguments reflected a growing 
legal dichotomy between two kinds of corporations: “public,” primarily munic-
ipal corporations, and “private” nonprofit and business corporations. This dis-
tinction had significant consequences. As Gerald Frug showed long ago, this 
shift diminished the idea of corporations as intermediate institutions between 
the people and the government: municipalities were now seen as part of the state 




Rendering municipal corporations “public” doomed their Contracts Clause 
claims, as courts reasoned that states had to be able to control institutions that 
judges regarded as state subdivisions. Even Justice Story, a robust defender of 
vested rights, excluded municipal charters from the Clause’s scope: “In re-
spect . . . to public corporations which exist only for public purposes, such as 
counties, towns, cities, &c.,” Story reasoned in 1815, “the legislature may, under 
proper limitations, have a right to change, modify, enlarge or restrain 
them . . . .”
310
 Four years later, the Court reiterated and reinforced this conclu-
sion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
311
 Although primarily about 
excluding municipal corporations from federal rights, these rulings reflected the 
growing ascendency of state legislative supremacy: they undercut longstanding 
claims about charter rights’ inviolability, and they depicted authority as flowing 
from state legislatures to localities. Long before the mid-nineteenth-century 
codification of state supremacy in the doctrine known as Dillon’s Rule, then, 
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“Private” corporations had better success advancing Contracts Clause claims 
to curb legislative power, especially under the Marshall Court, where they won 
several important victories.
313
 But this legal strategy of pitting corporations as 
rights-bearing artificial persons against state legislatures had limits. For one, 
success under the Contracts Clause required a contract: as Chief Justice Marshall 
observed, “The interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body, and its 
relations with its constituents, furnish the only security, where there is no ex-
press contract.”
314
 State legislatures quickly learned that they could avoid the 
Contracts Clause question by enacting corporate charters that reserved the leg-
islature’s right to alter the charter, a practice courts subsequently upheld.
315
 
Envisioning corporations as “private” institutions also cast the struggle be-
tween charters and legislatures as a contest between private corporate interests 
and the public good—an approach that increasingly advantaged states, especially 
in the new Taney Court. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, for instance, 
Chief Justice Taney refused to protect a Massachusetts company that invoked its 
eighteenth-century charter to try to halt the state legislature’s authorization of a 
competing bridge.
316
 “While the rights of private property are sacredly 
guarded,” Taney observed, “we must not forget, that the community also have 
rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their 
faithful preservation.”
317
 Taney’s conflation of community rights with the ac-
tions of the legislature, and his relegation of the company’s interests to private 
property, suggest how much the jurisprudential landscape had changed since the 
time of the Revolution. 
Legislative actions, too, furthered this fundamental shift in understanding. 
Antebellum legislatures ultimately established control over private corporations 
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by making many more of them: as one historian has observed, “proponents of 
anticharter doctrine became advocates of general incorporation laws.”
318
 The en-
actment of these laws—which began in the 1780s and accelerated throughout the 
antebellum period—abandoned the older conception of the corporate charter as 
a special privilege of quasi-state authority rooted in public service.
319
 Instead, 
the corporate form became a ubiquitous, and banal, method to pursue profit ra-
ther than the public good. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, then, legal changes had helped to defang the 
threat that ideas of corporate sovereignty posed to state legislative supremacy. 
Making municipalities “public” had made them creatures of state law, while “pri-
vate” corporations came to depend on federal vindication of their Contracts 
Clause rights to defend their charters—a limitation that state legislatures readily 
learned to circumvent. This shift did not mean the end of corporate power, par-
ticularly for increasingly wealthy and influential business corporations. But these 
corporations ceased to be legally corporate in the early modern sense: they no 
longer seemed to be miniature governments whose legitimate grounding in the 
people pitted them against state legislative supremacy. 
B. Secessionist and Populist Movements 
As with struggles over corporate charters, ratification did not quell populist 
challenges to governmental authority. But the Constitution altered the dynamics 
of these contests for authority, both by federalizing many state responsibilities 
and by inserting federal authority into contests within states. 
Populist discontent persisted, for instance, in much of the early American 
West, but the Constitution, coupled with state cessions and the Northwest Or-
dinance, transformed the region into federally controlled territories outside ex-
isting states.
320
 This change did little to resolve western settlers’ grievances, 
which remained rife. Franklinites, for instance, still griped about the distant and 
out-of-touch government even after North Carolina’s ceded western lands be-
came the Federal Southwest Territory.
321
 Yet such complaints were now directed 
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toward Washington, D.C., and settlers’ claims to statehood now depended on 
the approval of Congress, not of state legislatures.
322
 
Similarly, the 1790s witnessed two populist movements labelled as “rebel-
lions”—the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion and the 1798 Fries’s Rebellion.
323
 Like the 
earlier Massachusetts insurgency, both were antitax revolts that claimed the 
mantle of popular sovereignty. Yet because the federal government had taken on 
debts and burdens of taxation previously borne by the states, these two Pennsyl-
vania movements targeted federal rather than state authority and were sup-
pressed by federal troops. Such conflicts set a pattern: the advent of dual feder-
alism increasingly channeled some of the most intense constitutional struggles 
of the early republic into contests between states and the federal government, a 




Conflicts over sovereignty within states persisted alongside the flashy battles 
of vertical federalism, but their character changed, too. The New State Clause, 
for instance, effectively foreclosed secession from within a state. In the early 
1830s, residents in a disputed region between Canada and New Hampshire 
sought to create a new jurisdiction called “Indian Stream.”
325
 But, as Robert Tsai 
observes in his account of this effort, the residents “never considered [statehood] 
a serious option,” likely because it would have required New Hampshire’s con-
sent.
326
 After all, when the region’s residents appealed to the federal government 
for aid, they were instructed to turn to New Hampshire for relief.
327
 Unsurpris-
ingly, then, apart from the exceptional case of West Virginia, the only successful 
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Secession, though, was not the only opportunity to appeal to popular sover-
eignty in order to resist state authority. As Christian Fritz has shown, the possi-
bility that the people could, on their own initiative, alter and supplant a state 
constitution persisted in antebellum constitutional thought, producing a series 
of state constitutional conventions questionably authorized by state legisla-
tures.
329
 This invocation of popular sovereignty to overturn constituted state au-
thorities reached its zenith in what one newspaper editor labelled a “Second 
Shays’s Rebellion”
330
—Rhode Island’s Dorr Rebellion of 1841-1842, similarly 
named for its purported leader, Thomas Dorr.
331
 
The Dorr Rebellion sought to eliminate the restrictive voting requirements 
codified in Rhode Island’s fundamental governing document, its unaltered sev-
enteenth-century charter.
332
 To overturn these limits, the Dorrites set about cre-
ating their own government. They left little doubt as to their actions’ source of 
authority: they convened a “People’s Convention” that produced a “People’s 
Constitution,” purportedly ratified through a popular election. This constitution 
became the foundation for a new government, with Dorr as the “People’s Gov-
ernor.”
333
 The Dorrites rejected their opponents’ claims that these actions, un-
sanctioned by the legislature, illegally flouted fundamental law. “We contend for 
[the people’s] absolute sovereignty over all Constitutions,” Dorr wrote, “Con-
stitutions and plans of government not being barriers against Popular Sover-
eignty . . . but forms of expressing, protecting & securing the Rights of the Peo-




Both the Dorrites and the preexisting Rhode Island legislature appealed to 
the federal government for aid, the latter specifically invoking the terms of the 
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 President Tyler made his views on the merits of the two 
cases clear, though he avoided intervening on the grounds that there was no ac-
tual violence. The federal government, he promised, could only support “that 
government which has been recognized as the existing government of the State 
through all time past”; otherwise, the United States would become “the armed 
arbitrator between the people of the different States and their constituted au-
thorities,” which, he feared, would prove “dangerous” to “the stability of the 
State governments.”
336




The Dorrites then turned to the federal courts for vindication, concocting an 
elaborate trespass suit to assert their government’s legitimacy under principles 
of popular sovereignty. The resulting case—which the Supreme Court decided 
as Luther v. Borden
338
 in 1849—has usually been interpreted as standing for the 
proposition that whether a state possesses a “republican” government under the 
Guarantee Clause is a political question.
339
 Yet this reading distorts the case’s 
valence. Luther’s attorney, challenging Rhode Island’s government, barely men-
tioned the Clause, or even the Constitution: his case for the “People’s Constitu-
tion” derived largely from the claim that “the sovereignty of the people is su-
preme, and may act in forming government without the assent of the 
government.”
340
 It was the defendant’s attorney, Daniel Webster, who relied ex-
tensively on the Constitution, which, he urged, “recognizes the existence of 
States . . . [and] protect[s] them against domestic violence.”
341
 Webster contin-
ued: “The thing which is to be protected is the existing State government . . . . 
The Constitution . . . does not contemplate these extraneous and irregular alter-
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In a hand-wringing opinion focused on the limits of the federal courts, Chief 
Justice Taney sided with the defendants.
343
 He discussed the Guarantee Clause 
only to note that, to the extent the Clause conferred authority on the federal gov-
ernment to assess state governments, it empowered Congress and the President, 
not the courts.
344
 But the Chief Justice did offer brief thoughts on popular sov-
ereignty. “No one, we believe, has ever doubted the proposition, that, according 
to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every State resides in the 
people of the State,” he began. Yet whether the people had exercised that power 




Taney’s decision, then, rendered not just the Guarantee Clause but popular 
sovereignty itself a political question. But even this nonanswer was an answer of 
a sort. At each step in the Dorr conflict, every federal institution—Congress, the 
President, and the Supreme Court—deferred to Rhode Island’s existing govern-
ment. The Constitution, as interpreted by President Tyler and Chief Justice 
Taney, had a profound bias toward the status quo: it committed the federal gov-
ernment to protect only constituted state governments and provided no viable 
federal relief to those who sought to challenge that authority. 
This outcome was unsurprising: the alternate view, as one Justice observed, 
would make judges the definitive arbiters of when popular sovereignty had been 
exercised.
346
 More surprising, perhaps, was the Dorrites’ expectation that the 
federal courts would vindicate their claims, especially given their earlier suspi-
cion of the judiciary. Whether motivated by principle or pragmatism,
347
 the Dor-
rites’ decision to turn to the federal government for support carried the same 
implication: dual federalism had created a legal and political situation in which 
federal sovereignty increasingly offered the only viable check on state power. 
C. Native Nations 
Of all these diverse contentions, however, arguably the most significant con-
frontation between state sovereignty and its challengers in the antebellum 
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United States concerned the status of Native nations. In particular, the question 
whether Native and state sovereignty could coexist was at the center of the strug-
gle over so-called Indian Removal—the effort to forcibly relocate Native nations 
from within states to federal territory west of the Mississippi River. Removal, 
particularly of the Cherokee Nation, produced one of the era’s most intense con-
flicts between state and federal authority; it convulsed Native and Anglo-Amer-
ican politics alike, involving state courts and legislatures, Congress, the Presi-
dent, and ultimately the Supreme Court.
348
 Although these conflicts have 
received substantial scholarly attention, little work has focused on what, for An-
glo-Americans, was arguably the core jurisprudential question: whether the 
Constitution was best understood to require the federal government to check or 
protect state authority. 
Contentions over Removal had their roots in the unresolved jurisdictional 
tensions over Native status in the 1780s. Expansionist states still eagerly sought 
to engross Native lands, but the federal government embraced a more gradual 
approach to dispossessing and colonizing Native peoples. By the 1820s, southern 
states in particular began to panic that the nations within their borders—the 
Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations—had no intention of van-
ishing, as Anglo-Americans had assumed they would.
349
 Instead, with the sup-
port of the federal government, they were engaged in nation building in ways 
highly legible to Anglo-Americans.
350
 Native communities even began adopting 
Anglo-American forms and language to assert their sovereign rights. The 1827 
Cherokee Constitution, for instance, closely paralleled state constitutions, af-
firming, in English as well as in Cherokee, the nation’s “Sovereignty and Juris-
diction” over its territory on behalf of the “representatives of the people of the 
Cherokee Nation in Convention assembled.”
351
 
Native nations’ claim to sovereignty under federal law was straightforward: 
they had entered treaties with the federal government that guaranteed their 
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rights to territory and autonomy, treaties that the Constitution deemed the su-
preme law of the land.
352
 The federal government might not have regarded Na-
tive nations as fully independent, but it had long conceded that they retained 
some sort of sovereign status under the ultimate sovereignty of the United 
States—a position Chief Justice Marshall ultimately sought to capture with his 
neologism of “domestic dependent nations.”
353
 Moreover, textual and historical 
evidence overwhelmingly suggested that the Constitution granted the federal 
government exclusive authority over Indian affairs.
354
 
For their part, states, especially state courts, responded with a straightfor-
ward legal theory of their own: a conception of unitary and absolute state sover-
eignty explicitly cribbed from Blackstone. “It is a principle of the common law 
of England that the parliament is supreme,” the Alabama Supreme Court rea-
soned in a case challenging the state’s jurisdiction in Indian country.
355
 “This 
principle applies equally to our general assembly, with the exception of the re-
straints which are imposed upon it by the Constitutions of the United States and 
of this state.”
356
 Application of this principle led the states and their allies to re-
ject any possibility of divided authority within their borders just as clearly as 
British law had during the imperial crisis. “I know of no half-way doctrine on 
this subject,” reasoned one New York judge in 1822.
357
 “We [the state] either 
have an exclusive jurisdiction, pervading every part of the state, including the 
territory held by the Indians, or we have no jurisdiction over their lands . . . . It 
cannot be a divided empire: it must be exclusive, as regards them or us . . . .”
358
 
States’ supporters in Congress agreed. “A State either has jurisdiction or it 
has not,” argued the Committee on Indian Affairs, citing the New York case. 
“The principle upon which jurisdiction is assumed, does not admit of divi-
sion.”
359
 In making this argument, Removal proponents revived the language 
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the yale law journal 128:1792  2019 
1858 
and terms that British thinkers had deployed against the American colonies. Un-
less the state could exercise jurisdiction, another Alabama justice reasoned, “the 
Creek Indians . . . may establish and maintain a separate government forever, 
and the State of Alabama would have within its borders another and a distinct 
sovereignty; an imperium in emperio.”
360
 This portrayal of Native nations as an 
imperium in imperio was a commonplace in state arguments for jurisdiction.
361
 
Opponents of Removal were quick to catch the irony of states repurposing 
the dogma of unitary sovereignty. It was laughable, for instance, to suggest that 
the Cherokee were “a new nation, an ‘imperium in imperio,’ springing up,” one 
congressman observed, since the Cherokee, whose government predated Geor-
gia’s, “can urge this objection with more force than we can.”
362
 Others caught 
how bizarre state claims of absolute territorial sovereignty were in a federal sys-
tem. How could Georgia claim that “within the limits of a State there can be 
none others . . . that can claim to exercise the functions of Government,” another 
congressman queried, when the powers vested in the federal government “must 
be exercised within the States?”
363
 
Yet these critiques failed to blunt the states’ jurisdictional demands. Acting 
on their theories of unitary territorial sovereignty, Georgia, Alabama, and Ten-
nessee all enacted laws that purported to extend state jurisdiction into Indian 
country.
364
 Well aware that neither appeals to the states nor violence would be 
effective, aggrieved Native peoples had little recourse other than to the federal 
government, first through unanswered petitions and ultimately through litiga-
tion.
365
 As with the Dorrites, this expedient decision pushed Native arguments 
for autonomy into a dual-sovereignty frame, forcing them to ground their claims 
to authority not on divisible sovereignty and jurisdictional pluralism but on the 
balance of state-federal authority under the Constitution. 
Legally, this reliance on federal power proved a winning strategy. In Worces-
ter v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall firmly concluded that Georgia’s laws assert-
ing jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation were not only “extra-territorial”—a 
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conclusion that would not empower the Court to invalidate them—but also “re-
pugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”
366
 In reach-
ing this conclusion, Marshall adopted a reading of the Constitution as a nation-
alist document intended to cabin state authority: its text, he noted, 
unequivocally granted power over Indian affairs to the federal government, 
preempting the exercise of state authority.
367
 
Although states, for their part, often pitched their arguments as an effort to 
restrict federal involvement, they too appealed for federal support, demanding a 
Removal bill that would provide federal money and land for tribes’ relocation. 
States’ opponents caught this irony. “Georgia . . . is sovereign, and will do as she 
pleases: and they advise us to let her alone,” one congressional opponent ob-
served.
368
 “Sir, the difficulty is, she will not let us alone. She says, give us your 
money; pledge the national treasury to remove the Indians within our borders; 




To vindicate this demand for federal aid, states’ proponents also turned to 
the Constitution. But they read the document very differently from Chief Justice 
Marshall. Even as they relied on strained readings of the Commerce and Treaty 
Clauses to deny federal authority over Indian affairs,
370
 state advocates invoked 
constitutional provisions they believed mandated federal support for states 
against Native sovereignty. 
The New State Clause played a particularly prominent, if unlikely, role in the 
state supporters’ constitutional argument, one that extended it well beyond its 
textual meaning. President Jackson, for instance, quoted the Clause to advocate 
for Removal before Congress. “If the General Government is not permitted to 
tolerate the erection of a confederate State within the territory of one of the mem-
bers of this Union against her consent,” he argued by analogy, “much less could 
it allow a foreign and independent government to establish itself there.”
371
 Jack-
son was not alone: removal advocates routinely cited the New State Clause, par-
ticularly in a series of southern state supreme court decisions that spurned 
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Worcester and rejected Native claims to jurisdictional autonomy. “[I]f we can not 
reach [the Indians] by our statutes[,]” one Alabama justice asked, “if they can 
be encouraged to adopt a regular system of laws, a written code for their govern-
ment: is not a new state formed within this; are not our limits in truth, con-
tracted, by so much as is included in this ‘new state’?”
372
 
Removal advocates’ broad and tenuous reading of the New State Clause was 
consistent with their understanding of what they regarded as the Constitution’s 
fundamental purpose. While Marshall and the opponents of Removal inter-
preted the Constitution as a limitation on state power, President Jackson read the 
Constitution differently. If Native nations’ arguments prevailed, Jackson con-
tended, “the objects of this Government are reversed, and . . . it has become a 
part of its duty to aid in destroying the States which it was established to pro-
tect.”
373
 Jackson’s allies in Congress expanded on this claim: 
[T]he prime object of the States, in becoming parties to the Union, was 
to secure their own existence; and besides the express guaranty of each 
of them, which is to be found in the fourth article of the Constitution, 
the whole of that instrument may be said to constitute a general guaranty 
of the States, embracing not only the territory included in the limits of 




As the quotation suggests, this line of interpretation read the entire Constitution 
through the lens of the Guarantee Clause—as a document whose fundamental 
purpose was to protect, not cabin, state authority. This understanding of consti-
tutional intent entitled Georgia and Alabama, not the Creek and Cherokee, to 
federal aid. And, while it failed before the Supreme Court, this argument won 
the support of the President and a sharply divided Congress. Both endorsed Re-
moval and granted the states the federal aid they sought.
375
 In the end, the states 
successfully secured the jurisdiction they demanded—at great human cost.
376
 
Removal represented a coda of sorts to the struggles over the viability of an 
inherited system of jurisdictional pluralism and multiple sovereigns in a world 
dominated by an ideology of dual sovereignty. Arguably, that earlier intellectual 
world did not survive. Even as Worcester v. Georgia carved out space for Native 
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sovereignty, it altered the logic that had undergirded Native autonomy: instead 
of emphasizing, as earlier jurisprudence had, the quasi-foreign nature of Native 
peoples, Chief Justice Marshall guarded Native rights by fitting their claims into 
the frame of dual sovereignty, aligning them ever more closely with federal au-
thority.
377
 This line of reasoning had perverse consequences since, even as it the-
oretically protected Native nations, it subordinated them ever further to federal 
power. 
While dual sovereignty’s triumph empowered the federal government, it was 
arguably an even greater victory for the states. Although state advocates failed to 
abolish the concept of tribal sovereignty, they did manage to entrench the idea 
of dual federalism as natural and inevitable, making it seem as though state and 
federal sovereignty were all that had ever existed. As Jackson and others’ views 
suggested, and as Removal demonstrated, this conception of dual sovereignty 
bolstered state power as much as it limited it. Intoxicated by an ideology that 
made them supreme, confident that the Constitution obligated the federal gov-
ernment to endorse their assertions, states were increasingly unwilling to brook 
challengers to their claims to sole sovereignty within their territories. 
D. Text and Ideology 
“To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally 
unknown,” Justice Wilson—who had helped draft the document—famously 
proclaimed in the 1793 Supreme Court decision of Chisholm v. Georgia, which 
rejected the principle of state sovereign immunity and embraced a strong posi-
tion of popular sovereignty.
378
 But, while literally right, Wilson arguably mis-
read the background of sovereignty talk that profoundly shaped how the docu-
ment was interpreted and deployed—a discrepancy that produced a 
constitutional amendment overruling Chisholm and vindicating the states.
379
 
Unlike Chisholm, the triumph of dual sovereignty in the early republic rarely 
required changing the constitutional text, which provided resources for both 
proponents and critics of state sovereignty. Postratification competitors to state 
sovereignty themselves helped entrench the dual-sovereign frame when they 
turned, out of necessity and constraint, to the Constitution and the federal gov-
ernment to defend their autonomy. For their part, advocates of state sovereignty 
proved adept at grasping the portions of the Constitution that seemed to codify 
federal support for states. 
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Yet Chisholm highlights a broader dynamic that helps explain why states won 
many of these contests for federal support: the gap between constitutional text 
and ideology in early federalism. When states won, it was less because of the 
doctrinal merits of their claims than because of the widespread assumption that 
federal protection for state sovereignty was the law. This assertion’s foundation 
in constitutional text was shaky: the states’ interpretations of the provisions that 
they claimed vindicated their positions, like the Guarantee and New State 
Clauses, were, viewed from the present, thin, implausible, and highly purposive. 
States’ victories were, in this sense, ideological, as many Anglo-Americans came 
to believe that protecting states was a fundamental constitutional goal, and they 
interpreted the Constitution’s text in light of this aim. 
State success was ideological in another sense, too. Like all ideologies, the 
vision of perfect state territorial sovereignty never won the universal assent it 
sought, and dissenting views persisted. Yet the rise of dual sovereignty not only 
shaped legal doctrine but also channeled and altered the terms and scope of this 
resistance. Increasingly, even those who struggled against state sovereignty were 
constrained to do so within the legal frame their opponents had helped define. 
conclusion 
Although the Supreme Court began referring to “our dual form of govern-
ment” in the late nineteenth century,
380
 the term “dual federalism” was a coinage 
of the early twentieth-century constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin.
381
 No 
sooner had Corwin crafted this phrase, however, than he wrote a now-canonical 
law article warning of its “passing.”
382
 Corwin lamented the constitutional 
changes that the New Deal had wrought, especially the expansion of federal au-
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Corwin’s piece epitomized the triumph of the frame of dual sovereignty: in 
his vision, power in the United States was partitioned solely between the federal 
government and state governments, which existed in zero-sum relation to each 
other.
384
 But around the edges of Corwin’s account were hints that it had not 
always been so—that others might have a claim to something like sovereignty. 
“American federalism served the great enterprise of appropriating the North 
American continent to western civilization,” Corwin observed in cataloging fed-
eralism’s triumphs; it created “a new, a democratic, imperialism.”
385
 Implicit, but 
unspoken, in Corwin’s assertion were the sovereigns displaced and denigrated 
in this process of “appropriation”—what we would now label colonialism. 
Corwin’s formulation of “democratic imperialism” captured, albeit perhaps 
unwittingly, much about how federalism had functioned in the early United 
States. Dual federalism often was imperialist, a method of forcing nonconsenting 
groups to submit to unwelcome authority. And, even while it rested on wide-
spread exclusion, this expansion was democratic in its constant invocation of 
“the people” to justify subordination: popular sovereignty became a club with 
which states could beat their opponents into submission. Ironically, Corwin 
failed to recognize this imperialist process as an instance of “cooperative federal-
ism,” a term he objected to because “when two cooperate it is the stronger mem-
ber of the combination who calls the tunes.”
386
 The early history of the United 
States arguably bore out Corwin’s concern, but it suggests a different tune-giver 
than the federal government Corwin feared. 
As in Corwin’s account, struggles against state sovereignty often get shunted 
aside in favor of our great national drama of dual sovereignty. Nevertheless, they 
persist on the margins. As a quick glance at headlines reveals, corporations con-
tinue to fight state regulatory authority;
387
 municipalities and local governments 
still battle state legislatures for legislative authority;
388
 modern-day secession-
ists, like their eighteenth-century forbears, devise plans to carve new states from 
existing ones;
389
 and Native nations clash with states over jurisdiction in Indian 
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 Yet these contests take place primarily within a frame of dual sover-
eignty. Neither corporations nor municipalities are legally sovereign, and so they 
have prevailed against states largely when they have convinced federal courts 
that individual federal rights bar state action.
391
 Even state secessionists—now 
seen as crackpots rather than fundamental constitutional threats—have turned 
to federal courts claiming constitutional rights.
392
 
Native nations, by contrast, have retained formal legal recognition of their 
sovereignty in federal law, the result of their persistent activism in the face of 
states’ recurrent efforts to destroy their autonomy.
393
 Yet the survival of this con-
stitutional doctrine, rooted in the early modern logic of plural and divisible sov-
ereignty, continues to befuddle many—including, ironically, the Supreme Court 
Justices most committed to reconstructing original constitutional meanings.
394
 
The history presented here helps explain why tribal sovereignty—well-grounded 
in centuries of law and precedent—can nonetheless strike some observers as in-
comprehensible within our current jurisprudential frame. 
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Although the full normative and doctrinal implications of this history fall 
outside the scope of this Article, I will conclude by briefly sketching what I think 
might be a few possible takeaways. 
First, and probably most explicitly, this history challenges some of the com-
monplace narratives of the normative functions that federalism was intended to 
serve. At its inception, federalism was not solely about dividing power to protect 
individual rights, nor was it always a method to decentralize authority and em-
power local communities. To be sure, early Americans sometimes spoke of both 
these goals as the aims of federalism, particularly when, as in The Federalist, they 
sought to sell the merits of the Constitution to a skeptical public.
395
 But by fix-
ating solely on these aspects of early American discourse, we miss the widespread 
recognition and anticipation of many thinkers—including in The Federalist it-
self
396
—that federalism would also serve the opposite function, that of centraliz-
ing and concentrating power. Antebellum history vindicated this expectation, as 
states eagerly and often successfully conscripted federal authority against inter-
nal competitors. The existence of these multiple and conflicting aims of federal-
ism is not only a historiographical revision; it challenges the possibility of judi-
cial enforcement of a single original understanding of federalism, which, this 
Article suggests, did not exist.
397
 
Second, this history might help clarify states’ claims to federal support as a 
matter of positive law. On the one hand, conscripting federal aid on behalf of the 
states was an important aim of some of the Constitution’s drafters—a goal that, 
as antebellum fights demonstrated, often conflicted with the document’s other 
explicit purposes, particularly the keenly felt need to restrict state authority in 
order to further national aims. On the other hand, however, the proponents of 
state sovereignty arguably proved less successful than their opponents at writing 
their aims into the constitutional text. Jackson and his allies may have read the 
Guarantee Clause as the Constitution’s crux, but, as Antifederalists pointed out, 
the Clause’s narrow text did not actually codify broad claims to state sovereignty. 
Similarly, although state advocates read the New State Clause as though it were 
the guarantee of territorial integrity they had sought at the Convention, the 
Clause’s actual text was much more circumscribed. Yet state advocates’ failure to 
secure unambiguous constitutional text did not hurt them, since they arguably 
won the ideological struggle over interpreting the Constitution’s aims. This par-
adoxical success explains why recent judicial defenses of federalism have relied 
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extensively on “history and structure” rather than on definitive constitutional 
language, which is often lacking.
398
 But such reasoning is in tension with the rise 
of jurisprudential theories that emphasize that the democratically authorized 




Third, by focusing on the Constitution’s late eighteenth-century drafting, 
this Article necessarily slights the dramatic changes wrought by the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments. Although federalism’s post-Civil War remaking lies beyond 
the scope of this Article, the history explored here perhaps provides a suggestive 
frame for the period. As other scholars have traced, the drafters of the Recon-
struction Amendments were keenly aware of what they perceived to be the 
abuses and excesses of state sovereignty in the antebellum United States, and so 
sought to curtail states’ power by expanding federally granted and enforced 
rights.
400
 The result was a dramatic expansion of the dual-sovereignty frame al-
ready present before the Civil War, in which limitations on state sovereign rights 
against their competitors increasingly depended on invocations of ever-expand-
ing federal authority. In 1886, for instance, the Supreme Court announced the 
federal government’s complete authority over all aspects of Natives’ lives.
401
 It 
justified this sweeping power by invoking the federal government’s duty to pro-
tect “dependent” Native peoples, particularly against their “deadliest enemies”: 
“the people of the states where they are found.”
402
 That same day, the Court also 
reportedly ruled that corporations were “persons” under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, granting them a new and powerful federal tool with which to challenge 
 
398. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no constitutional text speaking to [whether Congress may 
compel state officers to execute federal laws], the answer . . . must be sought in historical 
understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of 
this Court.”). 
399. See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009). For an introduction to a vast and complicated literature on orig-
inal-public-meaning originalism, see Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) (“[T]he new originalism is focused less on the concrete inten-
tions of individual drafters of constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that 
was adopted.”). 
400. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 196 (1990); see also AMAR, supra note 157, at 156-59; Gerard N. Mag-
liocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE L.J. 875, 875-80 (2003). 
If, as Akhil Amar suggests, the Bill of Rights was intended to protect “intermediate associa-
tions” such as the “church, militia, and jury,” AMAR, supra note 157, at xii, then making the Bill 
of Rights enforceable against the states substantially expanded this dynamic. 
401. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1886). 
402. Id. at 384 (emphasis omitted). 
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whole swathes of state legislation.
403
 Municipalities, by contrast, were deprived 
access to federal rights and consigned entirely to state control: “[N]othing in the 
Federal Constitution . . . protects [cities],” the Court proclaimed when Pitts-
burgh attempted to invoke the Contracts Clause.
404
 “The power is in the 
state . . . .”
405
 
Finally, this Article, with its focus on sovereignty, intersects somewhat or-
thogonally with current federalism scholarship, which has become disillusioned 
with dual sovereignty as an intellectual frame. Scholarly discourse, these scholars 
lament, has echoed broader historical developments: by creating two distinct 
poles, dual sovereignty has constantly pushed federalism scholarship to rehash 
debates between nationalists and proponents of states’ rights. One proposed so-
lution has been a call for a new approach to federalism, one drained of sover-
eignty, which would, in the words of Heather Gerken, extend “all the way 
down,” beyond debates over federal and state power to encompass cities, juries, 
school boards, and the myriad institutions of governance in which authority is 
actually exercised.
406
 This move, Gerken argues, would grant minorities the 
“power of the servant—authority without sovereignty.
407
 
I am of two minds about what the history recounted here offers for this “new 
nationalist” school of federalism scholarship. In one sense, it offers a usable past. 
Gerken stresses that her vision of federalism is “not your father’s federalism,”
408
 
but perhaps it is your many-great-grandmother’s: federalism-all-the-way-down 
bears a more-than-passing resemblance to pre-Revolution America, where insti-
tutions of local governance possessed the kind of voice and autonomy that 
Gerken seeks. For a scholarly field that, at least to my eye, seems to be searching 
for alternate models of authority, this history offers an account different from 
the dominant dual-sovereign frame. 
And yet, this Article also suggests the limits of such a reimagining. In part, 
the objection is terminological. As depicted here, the routine invocation of fed-
eralism to describe any division of authority between local and central govern-
ments distorts the term’s historical specificity: federalism in the United States 
 
403. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394-95 (1886). As scholars have traced, 
the case’s caption distorted the Court’s actual holding, but this mangled version nonetheless 
became the basis for corporations to invoke all manner of federal rights. See WINKLER, supra 
note 117, at 113-60. 
404. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
405. Id. 
406. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 9. 
407. Id. at 33. 
408. Id. at 9. 
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has always implied dual federalism, the separation of sovereignty between states 
and the federal government.
409
 The point is not that federalism is determinate, 
or that it is, or should be, defined by what it meant at the time the Constitution’s 
adoption. It is, rather, that the meaning of terms as capacious, resonant, and 
central as federalism is accreted through centuries of collective contestation: as a 
result, as Justice Kennedy’s quote suggests, their current valence remains inex-
tricably bound up with their past. Gerken’s repurposing arguably attempts to 
separate the term from its history while still claiming this pedigree, like someone 
asserting a friend’s identity by putting on her coat. 
But the challenges go beyond the difficulty of dismantling the master’s house 
with the master’s tools. One problem concerns enforcement. Autonomy must be 
defended against its competitors. Yet if that protection comes from the federal 
government, which would retain the trump even in Gerken’s newly decentral-
ized system,
410
 then federalism’s history suggests how quickly fights over local 
independence would collapse into contests between state and federal power. 
Still more fundamentally, federalism-all-the-way-down misunderstands the 
historical function of sovereignty talk. Sovereignty is never as absolute as it as-
serts; as this Article demonstrates, even in the pre-Civil War era that Corwin 
nostalgically envisioned as dual federalism’s heyday, sovereignty as practiced 
was always incomplete, plural, and contested.
411
 In these struggles for authority, 
invocations of sovereignty were about more than autonomy or supremacy; they 
were proclamations of legitimacy, assertions about whose claims should be rec-
ognized and whose disregarded.
412
 Dual federalism restricted these claims of le-
gitimacy to the states and federal government, a move with meaningful and last-
ing consequences particularly for the communities excluded from this 
validation. 
 
409. Gerken inadvertently underscores this point when she describes states as the “only subna-
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the Language of State Sovereignty, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 645, 659, 662 (2000) (noting that a plu-
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“all that is meant is that state governments are important institutions whose interests should 
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